# Daily Report

# East Europe

FBIS-EEU-94-169
Wednesday
31 August 1994

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

# Daily Report
## East Europe

*FBIS-EEU-94-169* *31 August 1994*

CONTENTS

**NOTICE TO READERS:** All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.
An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.


**ALBANIA**

Prosecutor Concludes Treason Case Against Greeks *[Tirana TV]* ..... 1
Greek Police Tell Deportees to 'Topple System' *[Tirana TV]* ..... 1
Refugee Flow Increasing *[Tirana TV]* ..... 1
Greek Treatment Protested *[Tirana TV]* ..... 1
Montenegrin President Bulatovic Claims Shkoder *[POPULLI PO 24 Aug]* ..... 2

**BULGARIA**

Pavlov, Military Delegation Depart for Poland *[Sofia Radio]* ..... 3
Results of Trade Delegation's Visit to Russia *[Sofia Radio]* ..... 3
BSP Examines Approach to Early Elections *[DUMA 23 Aug]* ..... 3
Party Interest Behind DPS Attitude Toward Army *[KONTINENT 27-28 Aug]* ..... 3
Zhelev's Attitude Toward Coup Anniversary Viewed *[KONTINENT 29 Aug]* ..... 4

**CZECH REPUBLIC**

Klaus on State Budget, Public Perceptions *[DENNI TELEGRAF 26 Aug]* ..... 5
Klaus Discusses Law on Balancing Budget *[Prague Radio]* ..... 5
Minister Ruml on Issues of Agents, German Aid *[DENNI TELEGRAF 27 Aug]* ..... 6

**SLOVAKIA**

Commentary Calls U.S. Cuban Policy 'Irrational' *[PRAVDA 26 Aug]* ..... 7
Hungarian Party Chairman on Program, Coalition *[SLOVENSKY DENNIK 24 Aug]* ..... 7
SNS Chairman Names Possible Coalition Partners *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 23 Aug]* ..... 8
HZDS Cofounder Leaves Party, Espouses SDSS *[PRAVDA 25 Aug]* ..... 8
Meciar: No Intention of Canceling Customs Union *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 25 Aug]* ..... 8
Comment: SDL Divided on Coalition With HZDS *[PRAVDA 26 Aug]* ..... 9
SDL's Fogas Views Postelection Prospects *[NARODNA OBRODA 25 Aug]* ..... 9
Commander Outlines Army's Transformation *[SMENA 25 Aug]* ..... 10
Filkus Discusses Economic, Monetary Issues *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY, etc.]* ..... 11
Privatization of Power Companies Approved *[Bratislava Radio]* ..... 13

**HUNGARY**

Foreign Minister on Conditions for Czech Summit *[Budapest TV]* ..... 14
Editorial on Ethnic Hungarians in Romania *[NEPSZABADSAG 30 Aug]* ..... 14
Coalition Parties Support Growth Measures *[Budapest TV]* ..... 15
Cuba Strives To Attract Hungarian Investment *[MAGYAR NEMZET 20 Jul]* ..... 16
Environmental Affairs Committee Head Interviewed *[TALLOZO 21 Jul]* ..... 16
Changes in Office of Refugee Affairs Reported *[NEPSZABADSAG 28 Jul]* ..... 19
New Cabinet Chief's Role, Background, Goals *[NEPSZABADSAG 28 Jul]* ..... 19
Explosives in Budapest, Subotica 'Identical' *[NEPSZABADSAG 28 Jul]* ..... 20
Basic Principles of Media Law Discussed *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 28 Jul]* ..... 20
Local Governments Said To Support Danube Dam *[NEPSZAVA 28 Jul]* ..... 21
Environmentalists Oppose Government on Dam *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 27 Jul]* ..... 22

## POLAND

Milczanowski's Appearance Before Sejm Viewed *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 31 Aug]* ..... 24
High-Level Consultation on Appointment Promised *[Warsaw TV]* ..... 24
Walesa's Moves Discussed; Politicians Comment *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 30 Aug]* ..... 25
Daily Views Personnel Changes in Belweder *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 27-28 Aug]* ..... 26
Poll: Kwasniewski Heads List for President *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 29 Aug]* ..... 27
Lucchini-Warsaw Workers Vote for Wage Deal *[Warsaw Radio]* ..... 28

## ROMANIA

Leaders 'Lied' About Minister's PUNR Ties *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 25 Aug]* ..... 29

## BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Final Results: Peace Plan Rejected in Referendum *[TANJUG]* ..... 30
Justice Minister Views Federation Structure *[OSLOBODJENJE 25 Aug]* ..... 30
Silajdzic Calls for End to Arms Embargo *[AFP]* ..... 31
Bihac Official Guarantees Refugees Safe Return *[Sarajevo Radio]* ..... 32
Mortar, Grenade Explosions Increasing in Sarajevo *[Sarajevo Radio]* ..... 32
Serbs Continue Attack on Cazin Region *[Sarajevo Radio]* ..... 33
Serbs Fire 'Guided Missiles' on Zavidovici Lines *[Sarajevo Radio]* ..... 33
'Muslim Savagery' Reported on Krajina Front *[Sarajevo Radio]* ..... 33
4th Corps Commander Criticizes HVO *[Sarajevo Radio]* ..... 34
Commentary on Importance of Abdic's Defeat *[OSLOBODJENJE 25 Aug]* ..... 34
Tuzla-Podrinje SDA Committee Views Opposition *[Sarajevo Radio]* ..... 35

## CROATIA

Government Resists Pressure To Accept Refugees *[Zagreb Radio]* ..... 36
IDS Official Views HDZ Control Over Istria *[NOVI LIST 19 Aug]* ..... 36
HDZ, SDA Officials Meet in Zagreb *[Zagreb Radio]* ..... 36

## THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

FRY Citizen Killed in Border Struggle *[TANJUG]* ..... 38
Preelection Maneuvering by Parties, Personalities *[VECER 13-14 Aug]* ..... 38
Companies Violating Standards, Sanctions *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 19 Jul]* ..... 39
Domestic Prices Affected by Exports to Serbia *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 18 Jun]* ..... 40
Smuggling of Meat on Serbian Border *[VECER 19 Jul]* ..... 41
Newspaper Readership Figures Examined *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 13 Aug]* ..... 41
Former Party Official Investigated in Murder *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 5 Aug]* ..... 42

## YUGOSLAVIA

### Federal

Sainovic To Attend Libya Revolution Anniversary *[TANJUG]* ..... 44
Ministry on Increase of FYROM Border Incidents *[TANJUG]* ..... 44
Kosovo Leaders' Remarks on Dialogue Viewed *[NEDELJNA BORBA 27-28 Aug]* ..... 44
Sandzak Muslims Favor 'Indivisible' Bosnia *[Sarajevo Radio]* ..... 45

### Serbia

Milosevic Accepting Foreign Observers on Border *[Zagreb Radio]* ..... 45

### Prosecutor Concludes Treason Case Against Greeks

*AU3008170494 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 29 Aug 94*

[Report on proceedings of espionage trial against five ethnic Greeks by Armir Shkurti in Tirana—recorded]

[Text] [Shkurti] According to the prosecutor, the five defendants have committed the criminal act of treason against their homeland by placing themselves in the service of and carrying out orders by foreign secret services. Bezhani, Qirjako, and Sirmo are additionally charged with the illegal possession of arms.

State Prosecutor Qeleshi said that the law envisages harsh penalties for such crimes. He asked the court to pass lesser sentences than the minimum stipulated by the law.

The prosecutor demanded nine years imprisonment for Theodhori Bezhani, eight years for Vangjel Papakristo, and seven years for Panajot Marto. The three defendants are charged with conspiracy to commit crimes. Qeleshi asked for eight years imprisonment for Kosta Qirjako, for conspiring with Irakli Sirmo to commit a crime, and for Sirmo, Qeleshi requested nine years imprisonment.

The prosecutor considered the activity of the five defendants to be prejudicial to the Albanian state, with consequences in international relations between Albania and Greece. The indictment also considered the activities of the defendants as affecting the good of the nation.

The prosecutor asked the court to declare eight Greek nationals as personae non gratae in Albania, including the priest Sebastianos and the chief of Asphalia [Greek intelligence agency] in Ioannina, Andrea Zarbakulla.

Qeleshi stated that he would be presenting reports on the activities of several Greek institutions as well as Asphalia against our country to the General Prosecutor's Office for subsequent forwarding to the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

The proceedings resume at 0900 on Saturday, 3 September, with the case for the defense and closing statements by the defendants.

### Greek Police Tell Deportees to 'Topple System'

*AU3008121394 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 29 Aug 94*

[Report by Timo Luto]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] The deportation of Albanian emigrants from Greece continued today. Over to our correspondent Timo Luto, who was at the three Albanian-Greek border crossing points of Kakavije, Kapshtice, and Sarande today:

[Luto] It was a bit quieter today at the border crossing points with Greece. However, this can be said only for the Kakavije point, where today was really a normal day. Some 100 refugees were deported this morning. As of 1400, while we were here, there were no deportations except for the normal entries and departures of vehicles and people who had the relevant visas.

This small group of refugees has returned to avoid confrontation with the police.

There is a different scene at Kapshtice, where the deportation of refugees has been continuing since midnight. The refugees were detained and rounded up by the Greek police wherever they were, at work, home, or in the street, without allowing them to get those few personal things and the rewards of their labors. They look tired and hungry, but enraged and hurt as well. [passage omitted]

[Begin unattributed refugee recording] We ourselves know how they treated us, they are vile people. They did not show the least humanity as people. The police detained us, and told us to go back and topple the system and Sali Berisha. Then, they told us, you can come back again and we will keep you all. [passage omitted] [end recording].

Between midnight and 0700, 640 refugees were deported. The others were deported during the day. As you see, more continue to come. So far, some 1,200 refugees have been deported. [passage omitted]

The daily deportation of Albanian refugees by the Greek police continues.

### Refugee Flow Increasing

*AU3008132094 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 29 Aug 94*

[Text] We have just received fresh information on the deportation of Albanian refugees from Greece.

The flow of deported refugees is sharply increasing, the Public Order Ministry Spokesman Ludmilla Pajo reports. Today alone, 2,898 Albanian citizens were deported, with more than 80 having regular documents.

A large flow has been reported in Kapshtice, where 1,703 people were deported. Meanwhile, 1,130 refugees were deported in Kakavije, and 65 in Sarande.

The figures and those of the previous days confirm that the general number of deportees has amounted to 28,396 in only a few days. We will give you more information about the deportations in the newscasts tomorrow.

### Greek Treatment Protested

*AU3108113494 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Text] A group of television reporters arrived at our office during the late afternoon, so our figures pertain to that time. Several minutes ago, Public Order Ministry Spokesman Ludmilla Pajo reported that the general number of emigrants deported by Greece over the past days was 32,101.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

The way the Greek military and police forces are treating thousands of Albanians who have been employed in Greece for years is very upsetting, enraging, and insulting. Not only are these forces maltreating and assaulting Albanians, but what is more shocking is that they have imprisoned the majority of the Albanians in various Greek prison cells for two or three days.

At all hours of the day and night, they are unceasingly deporting our exhausted and shocked emigrants, who are under the stress of the nightmare of surprises arising from the brutal behavior of the Greek police and army.

During all last night and at dawn on 30 August, some 1,387 Albanian emigrants were deported. Their deportation has continued intensively since the early morning hours today. Thus, as of a few minutes ago, 760 emigrants were deported from Kakavije, 1,470 from Kapshtice, and 88 from Sarande, totalling 2,318 for today alone.

## Montenegrin President Bulatovic Claims Shkoder

*AU3008185894 Tirana POPULLI PO in Albanian 24 Aug 94 p 3*

[Unattributed report: "Bulatovic Lays Claim to Shkoder: TVSh Reports in a Low Voice, and Then Keeps Silent"]

[Text] Last Friday, 19 August, while the media of the two most ancient nations on the Balkan peninsula were simmering with opposing opinions about the "trial of the five," a surprising piece of news about Montenegro President Bulatovic was announced. The Ulcin, Montenegro correspondent reported by telephone that Bulatovic had, in a declaration, aired claims on Shkoder, an ancient dream of our little northern neighbor. None of the other political forces, added the Ulcin correspondent, had contradicted Mr. Bulatovic.

The declaration sounds unusual, given the bilateral initiatives taken in the past to advance relations, even without including Serbia. It seems that the Montenegrin president's visit to Tirana (which did not end in failure) has not (or has) caused the brains of certain Balkan politicians to be heated up now and then by national rhapsodies.

Nevertheless, what remains unclear for Albanian television viewers is why the report from the Ulcin correspondent was not transmitted again at 1400, 1800, 2000, and 2200? Was the news inaccurate? Or was there a certain reluctance to start a propaganda war with the northern neighbor? Or was it [passage illegible] too enigmatic this Albanian official information!

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

### Pavlov, Military Delegation Depart for Poland

*AU3108104494 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 31 Aug 94*

[Text] On 31 August a Bulgarian military delegation led by Dimitur Pavlov, deputy minister of defense for military policy issues, departed for Poland on an official visit.

The two countries' Ministries of Defense will sign an agreement in Warsaw on 1 September.

The delegation's program contains meetings with Piotr Kolodziejczyk, minister of national defense, and Brigadier General Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the Polish Army General Staff.

### Results of Trade Delegation's Visit to Russia

*AU2608185494 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 25 Aug 94*

[Text] On 25 August, Construction Minister Khristo Totev, Bozhidar Bozhinov, president of the Bulgarian Trade-Industry Chamber, and (?Beloglov), Khimimport general director, returned from Moscow.

They were members of the Bulgarian governmental delegation, which made an official visit to Russia.

During the talks the sides specified the new Bulgarian construction projects in Russia and discussed the trade with construction materials. A mixed gas industry company will be established and seated in Bulgaria. An agreement on supplying the Bulgarian refineries with oil will be signed.

Talks were conducted on settling the mutual debts of Bulgaria and Russia, an issue that is expected to be resolved in October, during the visit of Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to Bulgaria.

Deputy Prime Minister Tsochev will return from Georgia on Saturday [27 August].

### BSP Examines Approach to Early Elections

*AU2908115494 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 23 Aug 94 p 6*

[Plamen Enchev commentary: "Obstacles Along the Road to Elections"]

[Text] Everything shows that early elections will hardly be held before the end of 1994. It is much more probable that they might be scheduled for the beginning of 1995, as long as this deadline does not prove too early.

Yesterday's statements made by three politicians who could not be suspected of reaching a mutual consensus confirm the aforementioned argument.

Zhan Videnov, after meeting trade union leader Krustyu Petkov, admitted the possibility of a new government within the framework of the current parliament, although he described such a situation as meaningless.

Nikolay Slatinski, speaking in Pernik, urged everyone to find decent, uncorrupt Bulgarian patriots to form a new government. According to him, the option of holding early elections within the forthcoming months is dangerous because it would consolidate the current constellation in parliament. Slatinski considers the recent attempts by those who realize that they have no chance of being elected ever again to concoct a new majority, as absolutely unreliable.

Last, but not least, Filip Dimitrov himself, in an interview for a regional newspaper, acknowledged that the Union of Democratic Forces is not ready for elections and expected to suffer a disgraceful defeat.

Actually it appears that only some extra-parliamentary forces are absolutely committed to the desire for early elections, while the forces represented in parliament more soberly prefer to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of future coalitions, and to examine what they could offer their constituents in the case of their victory.

The Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] has declared on several occasions that only new elections are likely to permit a change of the current policy, which has disgraced itself in the eyes of the common people and has caused a dramatic deterioration in their living standard. Those who are to take over the government after winning the elections cannot fail to combine their efforts with a long-term forecast of the country's future social and economic life. Unlike the recent past, today and next year the success of the political forces in early elections will be determined by feasible pledges for the future, rather than by mere propaganda.

In this respect, even if there should be no elections by the end of 1994, this would not be a deviation from the BSP's declared stance. Nevertheless, politics are never a one-way development. It would not be surprising if the forthcoming September surprises us with a confidence vote for the cabinet, rather than with the expected new government. It is evident that Professor Berov does not intend to resign on his own. His cabinet has recently demonstrated self-confidence and the wish for a longer life.

One sign of the existence of such trends was the fact that the ministers have increased their own salaries and are earning 20,000 leva a month. Apart from that, vegetable oil is in short supply on the market, meat prices have gone up, and so have gasoline prices. Generally speaking, we can see no light at the end of the tunnel.

### Party Interest Behind DPS Attitude Toward Army

*AU3008091694 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 27-28 Aug 94 p 4*

[Genka Markova commentary: "Postpopulists"]

[Text] Deputy Ivan Palchev demonstrated concern for our national security and demanded that the first parliament session after the vacation be turned into a closed one and that the chief of the General Staff be asked to report on the case of the retired colonels.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

It would do no harm to recall that for many days the parliamentary faction of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS], whose member Ivan Palchev is, demonstratively declined to attend the National Assembly sessions when the text of the Defense Bill was debated. The same parliamentary faction used its Byzantine skill and shifted the bill's basic focus—the Army reform and state security—to the secondary issue of the Construction Troops and the commands' language.

Ivan Palchev successfully collected the signatures of his colleagues, who are as concerned as he is. It would be wonderful to publish this list of signatures and then compare it with the names of the DPS deputies who were absent from the National Assembly hall when the Defense Bill was debated. This would be enough to expose the unleashed postpopulism that seeks purely parliamentary goals.

In the last four years the politicians have not tired of taking jabs at the Army. The members of all feeble political forces utilized every conceivable argument in an attempt to benefit from the discussion of the Army reform. They conveniently forgot that this does not turn the Army into a more powerful one, or contribute to enhancing the state security. They also forgot that this does not add to the respect enjoyed by the respective political force.

## Zhelev's Attitude Toward Coup Anniversary Viewed

*AU3108094494 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 29 Aug 94 p 4*

[Dragomir Draganov commentary: "History Should Not Be Used for Current Political Purposes"]

[Text] It appears that Dr. Zhelev has really relinquished his candidacy for a second mandate as the president of all Bulgarians, or at least that he thinks there is enough time until the end of his current mandate.

Otherwise he would not have deliberately ventured the historical quarrel with a significant section of the citizens, especially when the delicate subject of whether 9 September 1944 was the end of fascism or the beginning of totalitarianism is involved. It is absolutely clear that one third of the population thinks in a certain way, the second third—in another, while the rest have no opinion and do not care at all about the subject.

Prudent politicians leave such subjects for history to resolve. This way they avoid for example the question of why the Slovak insurrection is "an important and authentic event," while 9 September was "a coup against a democratic government," especially since both events were coordinated by Moscow.

Prudent politicians simply do not involve history in current politics and do not use its dramas in order to provoke their opponents.

The benefit of such behavior is doubtful. One should only recall the 1990 elections' geographic map with the scuhs [a visual aid that backfired in the 1990 election campaign when used by the Union of Democratic Forces to mark the geographic locations of former communist labor camps]. Furthermore, after five years of democracy the Bulgarian citizens have become wiser and would hardly be provoked by politicians to begin a quarrel about our past. After all, they are concerned first of all with their future.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

## Klaus on State Budget, Public Perceptions

*AU3108104194 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 26 Aug 94 p 3*

["Regular interview" with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Viktor Krejci; place and date not given: "The National Property Fund Is a Part of the Entire Budgetary System"]

[Excerpts] *In today's regular interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, we deal with some questions concerning the state budget. We also speak about the Komercni Banka, which is terminating long-term deposits, and the results of a public opinion survey, according to which two-thirds of citizens believe that the government officials enjoy the same or greater privileges than the representatives of the former regime.*

[Krejci] According to some expressed opinions, the government, fearing a deficit, plans much higher budget revenues than is necessary. Is that true?

[Klaus] It is absolutely childish and nonsensical to foist upon us some interest in having revenues higher than expenditures. We are trying for a minimum possible budget, and the fact that, at this time, it is developing relatively favorably again is the result of several factors. It is, above all, the tremendous shift in the trade clearing balance with Slovakia. At the time of drafting the budget, we had outstanding claims against Slovakia that had to be covered from our budget. Today, the situation is reversed, and the difference is covered from the Slovak budget. Therefore, our budget shows a marked surplus, and this symmetrical mirror-reflection movement has absolutely nothing to do with anything specific that the ministry does with revenues and expenditures.

[Krejci] Apropos the budget, the role of the National Property Fund [FNM] is being discussed. There are opinions claiming that money from the FNM is being used in the state budget and that it would otherwise be in deficit.

[Klaus] One has to think within the context of public budgets. The environment fund, for instance, or the FNM are a part of the entire budgetary system, although they were separated from the state budget. The decision then of whether a particular fund is to be separated from the state budget is more or less voluntary—I do not want to say random—and can be changed just the same. That means that the FNM and the environment fund could again be part of the state budget. [passage omitted] If we cover the cost of some of the heritage of the past from the FNM, why not link these two budgets?

[Krejci] How do you feel about the conduct of the Komercni Banka, which announced that it will prematurely terminate long-term deposits because the interest rate does not offer a sufficient return for the bank?

[Klaus] I do not know whether the Komercni Banka prepared and explained this step well enough, whether it has sufficient legal backing, and whether it can offer a rational way out. I do not wish to comment on it because all of my information about this affair comes from the media. [passage omitted]

[Krejci] According to a STEM [Center for Empirical Research] survey, two-thirds of citizens believe that the present government enjoys the same or more privileges and advantages compared with the former communist officials. Is that true? Why, would you say, people believe such a thing?

[Klaus] It is not true. The present government officials have absolutely no advantages, and, in addition to their salary, they have only two things at their disposal—a car and one telephone. Nothing else. [passage omitted]

The source of this public belief is more interesting. Now, I must ask, what is the role played by the media in this? The citizens clearly see nothing like that directly, but they can hear about it or read it in the media. And that is something that worries me.

## Klaus Discusses Law on Balancing Budget

*LD3008173994 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1615 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Regular weekly interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Vladimir Pavlovsky—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Pavlovsky] Prime Minister, you have often talked about the advantages of a balanced budget. However, the Civic Democratic Party's proposal to have the balanced budget written into law provoked such a surprise that, in my opinion, the proposal deserves to be justified again by some strong argument as to why it was passed.

[Klaus] I am very happy that it provoked this discussion because it is a very important subject. [passage omitted]

If some politicians have a strong view on this issue, they will naturally try to make sure that this principle of sensible management is built into the system as such as much as possible. This leads to a logical conclusion: to make it into a law.

It is obvious that this will have to be a stronger law than an annual law on the state budget because, if it is an ordinary law, every state budget, which is a law in itself, could change this law as desired. Therefore, I do not quite understand why is it surprising that this might be a constitutional law. This simply cannot be anything but a law that is stronger than an annual law on the state of the budget.

Therefore, I am glad that this discussion has started, and the only thing that is intriguing about it is that strong words have been used in it. I have read all of the rejoinders rather carefully and have not come across a single matter-of-fact one that this would be a bad idea. [passage omitted]

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

## Minister Ruml on Issues of Agents, German Aid

*AU3008170694 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 27 Aug 94 p 3*

[Interview with Interior Minister Jan Ruml by Kristian Chalupa in Znojmo on 21 August: "I Have Never Overestimated the Role of Agents in Our Country"]

[Excerpts] On 21 August, Interior Minister Jan Ruml took part in a meeting with citizens in the Znojmo District Office building. We took this opportunity to ask Minister Ruml a number of topical questions.

[Chalupa] Sir, a lot has been said recently about agentomania. Former federal interior minister Richard Sacher said that the former StB [State Security] lost the ability to affect the situation in our state. What do you believe regarding this issue?

[Ruml] I have never overestimated the role of agents in our country because there is no indication of their creating networks or information systems, or of attempting to organize activity that might lead to the downfall of this regime. Nevertheless, one must remember that they were agents of the communist intelligence or counterintelligence service, basically an intelligence service in an undemocratic state. Therefore, in addition to the moral aspect of the whole issue, their intentions may be in accordance to the organizations that in effect controlled our intelligence, and these are organizations on the territory of the former Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

[Chalupa] Next month, you will discuss with your German counterpart financial aid for the Czech Interior Ministry. What kind of aid is it, and how much?

[Ruml] In principle, this aid concerns the entire issue of illegal migration, the proportions of which have recently become very favorable. The number of illegal crossings of the state border has considerably declined because of the existence of the Czech-Slovak border and the readmission treaties. The signing of a readmission treaty with Germany is fast approaching. [passage omitted] The aforementioned aid consists mainly of certain hardware equipment for the Aliens' Police to set up computer systems and technical equipment for the Border Police to facilitate better surveillance of the state border. We also want to improve the computer systems of our consulates.... [passage omitted] I do not wish to cite the amount of the aid. It will not be as high as that provided to Poland, but it will certainly not be a negligible amount. [passage omitted]

[Chalupa] The penetration of various Mafias from Russia, Ukraine, and other countries of the former Soviet Union is a recurrent theme in all discussions of organized crime. What is the present cooperation like with the Interior Ministries of these states?

[Ruml] The problem is that personnel changes are very frequent in both Russia and Ukraine. Because of the elections in Ukraine, the entire top brass of the Interior Ministry was replaced. Therefore, the contacts must be reestablished. [passage omitted]

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

### Commentary Calls U.S. Cuban Policy 'Irrational'

*AU3108080794 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 26 Aug 94 p 20*

[Commentary by Leopold Moravcik: "Sensitive Spot of the United States"]

[Text] From the geopolitical viewpoint and according to the behavior of the U.S. Administration, Cuba might be called the U.S.'s sensitive spot. Whenever someone gives it a prod, Washington squeals and starts behaving irrationally.

This is also the case now in connection with the mass exodus of Cubans. Until recently, refugees from this island enjoyed privileged status in the United States. This is epitomized by a statement by former President Carter, who said in 1980 on a similar occasion: "Our arms and hearts are open to you."

Fidel Castro took Carter at his word then and opened not only ports but also prisons and psychiatric hospitals. When kind-hearted Uncle Sam saw what kind of people were coming to the country, the open arms and open hearts disappeared forever.

A similar situation is recurring now with desperate economic conditions, also caused by a U.S. embargo, making many Cubans seek relief in flight to the United States on stolen rafts. Leader Fidel Castro responded to this with his typical southern temperament: "Let them go."

Ever since, Cubans have had free passage, and the U.S. Coast Guards have had problems with refugees. They are dealing with the problem by deporting the refugees to the Guantanamo naval base. Ironically, those who desired to live in the United States thus find themselves back in Cuba.

President Clinton reacted to the situation according to the law of touching the sensitive spot. He ordered additional measures against Cuba in the hope of bringing Fidel to his knees. However, measures such as the continuing embargo or limits on the amount of money Cubans living in the United States are allowed to send their relatives on the island will only make living conditions worse and will provoke another wave of refugees—that is, that which the United States is now resisting tooth and nail.

The U.S. Administration's irrational approach to Cuba stands out when compared with U.S. policy toward the PRC, Vietnam, or even the DPRK. The President pushed through the extension of most-favored-nation status for China on the grounds that this will strengthen democracy and the observance of human rights in the country. Recently, the United States also abolished trade restrictions against Vietnam and sat down for negotiations with a representative of the Korean dictator Kim Il-song, going so far as to offer him economic aid and political recognition. The U.S. Administration thus managed to rise above the setbacks of its policy in China and forget the humiliations suffered in the Korean war and even the ignominious defeat in Vietnam. When the issue of Cuba and Fidel Castro is brought up, however, great diplomacy ends.

One can find only one motive for this approach in the U.S.'s conduct. Castro and his people stood up against the pro-U.S. Government in Cuba and ousted dictator Batista from the country 35 years ago. This happened at the time of the Cold War, and all of the U.S. presidents, starting with Kennedy, succumbed to anti-Cuban moods. Washington stepped up its pressure against Cuba to such an extent that it turned Fidel into a committed Marxist and close ally of the USSR. However, what was effective as a bogey and military threat during the Cold War period is now becoming ineffectual. Perhaps it will be the example of the U.S. approach toward socialist China and Vietnam and toward the authoritative, all-controlling regime in the DPRK that will finally make the U.S. Administration realize that, also in relation to Cuba, it is possible to apply tactics other than an embargo, which has provoked the exodus with which the U.S. authorities are now unable to cope.

### Hungarian Party Chairman on Program, Coalition

*AU2608190294 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 24 Aug 94 p 2*

[Interview with Vojtech Bugar, chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, by "rim" in the "One Question" column; place and date not given]

[Text] [SLOVENSKY DENNIK] The Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] contends that the resolution of the Association of Zitny Ostrov Towns and Villages on territorial self-administration in southern Slovakia, which is part of the Hungarian coalition's electoral program, stands in the way of the possible formation of a broad postelectoral coalition with Hungarian parties. What is the position of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement on this issue?

[Bugar] It is very premature to speak about this now. One of the postelection scenarios is that a government coalition, composed in roughly the same way as the present one, will come into being and will require the support of the Hungarian parties. In that case, it will be necessary to address the question to the SDL how their opinion has changed. The Komarno document contains nothing that would be directed against Slovak statehood or that would jeopardize the territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic in any way. It contains principles that must be negotiated. I consider declarations about the impossibility of cooperating with parties subscribing to those principles in their electoral program irresponsible. These problems will have to be discussed when tackling the new territorial and administrative division of Slovakia, not to mention discussing the right of the citizens of southern Slovakia to decide on economic development in their own region.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

### SNS Chairman Names Possible Coalition Partners

*AU2608190394 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA (SNS supplement) in Slovak 23 Aug 94 p 2*

[Interview with Slovak National Party Chairman Jan Slota by Miroslav Sasky; place and date not given: "Do You Know Them?"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Sasky] How do you view the distribution of political forces in Slovakia before the approaching election?

[Slota] Evidently, there are two camps that cannot be assigned labels according to standard criteria. The terms "right wing" and "left wing" have become meaningless in Slovakia. The present Left-Right conglomerate of political parties that have, more or less, an antinational character stands against groupings that want to enforce the interests of the state-forming nation in an unequivocal and uncompromising fashion. At the same time, we must not forget that this government exists only by the grace of the Hungarian parties. This rounds up the true picture. Here it is necessary to stress that the Slovak National Party [SNS] has not changed its program in the least since its inception (more than 130 years ago!). It has always fought for the rights of this nation and will continue to do so. The Magyarization of southern Slovakia, to which we have borne witness in recent months, shows that this struggle has lost none of its significance. This involves no longer education or culture alone, but also the economic aspirations of Hungarian political entities. Their goal, the disruption of Slovakia's integrity, is quite obvious, and the General Prosecutor's Office should have dealt with it a long time ago.

[Sasky] What, actually, is the SNS's goal in the coming election?

[Slota] Our main goal is to ensure that Slovakia is truly ruled by Slovaks, not by those with Slovak nationality as entered in their personal documents but by those who act, think, and feel like Slovaks. Be it in education, culture, defense, or economy, Slovak policy must clearly prefer the interests of Slovakia and Slovaks.

[Sasky] With which political parties is the SNS ready to form a coalition?

[Slota] The outcome of these elections will definitely not be unequivocal. No political entity will win enough votes to be able to form a government on its own. The SNS does not want to rule out cooperation with any political entity, with the sole exception of the Hungarian political parties, which obviously betray the idea of independent Slovak statehood and are not loyal to their own country. There is a fundamental conflict here. Otherwise, we realize that, without political stability, there will not be any economic stability, and, therefore, we are ready to cooperate with everyone who is concerned about Slovakia's well-being. As far as individual entities are concerned, the Christian Democratic Movement has so far been manifesting itself, regrettably, as antinational. Likewise, personally, I would not be in favor of cooperating with Weiss's wing of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL]. Even in the SDL, however, there is a current that might be called "patriotic" [narodniarsky]. The SNS does not rule out cooperation with this current. The Association of Workers of Slovakia, which also asserts national interests, could also become a political force to be reckoned with. This movement could also become an SNS partner.

### HZDS Cofounder Leaves Party, Espouses SDSS

*AU2908192794 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 25 Aug 94 p 2*

[Unattributed report: "Social Democratic Party of Slovakia—Reinforcement From the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia"]

[Text] "After the termination of the current term of parliament, I want to become an active member of the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS]," Ivan Laluha, deputy for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic Foreign Affairs Committee, who was one of the founding HZDS members, announced yesterday. He said that the HZDS, as a broad centrist movement, cannot remain forever a political entity without a clear profile. If this movement does not find a clear orientation, it will remain a movement that only seeks power. According to Ivan Laluha, the big bang in the HZDS club of deputies only produced another centrist movement, the Democratic Union, which is not a new element on the political scene, although it is beginning to gravitate toward liberalism. In the opinion of Deputy Laluha, external pressure will force movements such as the HZDS and the DU to differentiate their views because European institutions are working on the basis of political factions.

### Meciar: No Intention of Canceling Customs Union

*AU2908153194 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 25 Aug 94 p 2*

[Article by Fridrich Hlava: "The Policy Line Is Clear and Realistic"]

[Excerpts] Trnava—Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], met with some 80 businessmen from Trnava and its surroundings yesterday morning. [passage omitted]

Meciar said that, after its electoral victory, the HZDS is determined to set up an agency to insure Slovak exports, to renew the issuance of promissory notes to finance exports, and to support the establishment of holding companies for the development of the capital market. The movement wants to reinforce the powers of villages, towns, and regions and achieve that regions retain a share of collected taxes. [passage omitted] In the opinion of the HZDS, the Slovak Republic must switch as soon as

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

possible toward a developmental economic policy, and it is within the country's potential to achieve a GDP growth of 2 percent as early as 1995. If it is in the government after the elections, the Movement will bring the average level of unemployment down to under 10 percent and will take steps to maintain stability of the currency so that it can become freely convertible after the year 1998. He promised cuts in taxes and levies for businessmen but said that any cuts would be pegged to investment. It will pay off to grow in size. The HZDS welcomes foreign capital in the sphere of new technologies, modernization, the reconstruction of firms, and the joint acquisition of markets, on the understanding that the Slovak partners' share in the market is retained. The only way to maintain energy prices in Slovakia is by excluding the energy industry from privatization for the time being.

According to the HZDS chairman, the HZDS's attitude toward the church is characterized by the maxim that the church is above political parties—it must survive even when parties perish. Vladimir Meciar drew citizens' attention to the fact that two parties running in the election have in their program the restoration of the CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federal Republic] or a unitarian state. He said that the Moravcik government allowed the penetration of Czech foodstuffs into Slovakia, although their export is being subsidized. According to Meciar, the customs union with the Czech Republic will be maintained even if the HZDS wins the election. [passage omitted]

## Comment: SDL Divided on Coalition With HZDS

*AU3108112194 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 26 Aug 94 p 3*

[Commentary by Milan Stanislav: "Divide and Rule"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] With the parliamentary election approaching, it is becoming increasingly obvious from the polls on electoral preferences that no political entity will be able to form a government on its own. Slovakia will most likely have a coalition government. In view of real sympathies for individual parties among voters, the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] holds the key to any coalition. Essentially, two possibilities can realistically be expected. The continuation of the broad coalition, in a new composition, of course, influenced by electoral gains, or a Movement for a Democratic Slovakia-SDL [HZDS-SDL] coalition. These two options represent an internal dilemma for the SDL, and it seems that, at the very least, they are in for a sharp discussion about their postelection course of action. Although the SDL has until now been able to resist the splitting processes that are so typical of our political scene, the leader of the strongest movement [Vladimir Meciar] would surely welcome any weakening of the SDL. On top of that, judging from his campaign rhetorics heretofore, he still has not given up the idea of assisting in the replacement of the SDL leadership. [passage omitted]

After the publication of the HZDS motion of a vote of no confidence in her, Brigita Schmognerova could no longer remain silent. No attentive observer could fail to notice the "miniature" difference between her comments and views on postelection developments and the statements of Lubomir Fogas, who does not strictly reject the possibility of a coalition with the HZDS and, what is more, concedes the possibility of political leaders being replaced. The view that the deputy prime minister presented as her personal one—namely, that the HZDS has again proved its inability to cooperate—is close to the views of SDL Deputy Chairman Milan Ftacnik and is bound to trigger an internal party debate. The result of this debate, which we will learn only after the election, will show how successful the political maneuvers in parliament have been. [passage omitted]

## SDL's Fogas Views Postelection Prospects

*AU3108111994 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 25 Aug 94 pp 1, 3*

[Interview with Lubomir Fogas, deputy chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left and deputy chairman of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, by Martin Hric in Bratislava on 22 Aug[illegible]: "Lubomir Fogas: Postelection Stalemate Would [illegible]an Exchange of Generation of Political Leaders"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Hric] Let me ask you, as a major representative of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], do you rule out a postelectoral coalition between the SDL and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]?

[Fogas] We have never discussed this issue, neither in our party bodies nor with the HZDS. If a stalemate situation occurs after the election, this situation will have to be carefully considered. The task of politicians is not to destroy the political scene but to be able to communicate and come to an agreement in order to stabilize the political situation. Much will then depend not only on the affinity of programs, but also on the terms of the coalition.

[Hric] Hence, you are part of that wing in the SDL leadership that does not rule out a coalition.

[Fogas] While we are engaged in sharp disputes from time to time, we do not have any wings. There definitely are not any pro-Weiss and anti-Weiss or pro-Meciar and anti-Meciar wings in the SDL. The conflicts are by no means such that they could disrupt the SDL's common interests.

[Hric] What, then, are the sharp disputes about?

[Fogas] They are about strictly pragmatic issues—whether the new territorial arrangement should give consideration to socioeconomic aspects or a fixed percentage of taxes should stay in the regions and villages to prevent redistribution from the center. We also have

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

discussions about our position on the electoral system, privatization, the use of coupon privatization. [passage omitted]

[Hric] We have come across speculations about you as prime minister in a HZDS-SDL postelection coalition. Would you be ready to accept that post?

[Fogas] (Laughing) This is the third time I have been given this question by reporters. It is a very hypothetical question. I repeat that no talks have been held between us and the HZDS on coalition issues, let alone about personnel issues. But I do not want to dodge an answer. First, I would give a thought to who the partner willing to cooperate in a coalition would be. If you do not know how the coalition partner will behave tomorrow, you are running an enormous risk—not a personal risk but a risk for this period, for Slovakia.

[Hric] How do you explain that the present electoral preferences for the [SDL-led coalition] Common Choice are lower than the arithmetic sum of the original preferences for its individual constituent parts?

[Fogas] The decline is not significant, and I expect it to turn around. The causes can be manifold: Many government measures in which we take part have a severe impact on the citizen. The government is in the paradoxical situation that, although it did not cause the 23-billion-koruna deficit, it must cope with its consequences, that, although it did not prepare the budget, it must manage within its limits, and that, although it arranged for the standby loan from the IMF, it may not be able to make use of it.

The SDL does not have its own newspaper, which prevents us from promptly explaining our steps to our voters. There may also be some objections among our members to cooperation with right-wing parties, although in Switzerland such a coalition has been working successfully for years. There are objections to our cooperation with politicians who used to attack us harshly. On the other hand, many understand that, in a time of crisis, it was necessary to demonstrate, so as to prevent Slovakia's image from further deteriorating, that Slovak politicians are able to come to an agreement.

[Hric] During talks on a coalition, each party must have certain room for maneuver and compromise because no agreement is otherwise possible. But each party also has its limit, beyond which it will not retreat. If the election winner turns out to be unable to form a government on his own and if a right-left coalition does not materialize, be it because of the Hungarian parties' position or for other reasons, what are the limits beyond which you would not be able to retreat?

[Fogas] 1. We would insist that the structure of state power not be changed by means of substantial changes to the Constitution.

2. We would like to assert the maximum of our ideas on ways of solving economic problems.

3. We would like to stop the carousel of personnel changes in the wake of each election, not because we have our own people in these posts—we do not—but because the quality of state administration declines when there are permanent changes from the top to the bottom.

4. We would demand the formation of a government that would deal with problems pragmatically and thereby introduce peace among citizens, instead of permanently traumatizing them.

[Hric] Has the SDL member base not declined as a result of departures for Luptak's Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] and Dado's Communist Party of Slovakia?

[Fogas] The decline represents 2 percent, but, according to our surveys, we have won over believers, who now represent 50 percent of our members. [ZRS Chairman] Janko Luptak is to this day a member of our club of deputies, and I hope that communication between us will be possible after the elections. [passage omitted]

[Hric] One last question: Should there be a stalemate situation after the elections and should politicians be unable to form a government, whatj, in your opinion, would be the solution?

[Fogas] The exchange of political leaders for a new generation of younger politicians capable of communicating and coming to an agreement. Such politicians are to be found even within today's political entities.

### Commander Outlines Army's Transformation

*AU2908201694 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 25 Aug 94 pp 1-2*

[Article by "kf": "We Are Going To Have a General Staff"]

[Text] Bratislava—Three stages of transformation are awaiting our Army until the year 2000. After their completion, the Army of the Slovak Republic [ASR] should, as ASR commander General Julius Humaj noted at a news conference in Bratislava yesterday, draw closer to the West European security structures, in terms of the system of command and management and other attributes, and be ready to join NATO.

As previously reported in SMENA, the first stage of transformation (1994-95) should see, first and foremost, the completion of structural changes—transition to the brigade system and transformation of the ASR command and the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic. The ASR General Staff will go into operation as of 1 September. By the end of the first stage, we must also meet our commitments arising from the Vienna convention (that is, eliminate surplus weaponry and reduce troop numbers to 46,667 men).

The second stage will focus on improving the quality of command and troop management, so as to make the

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

ASR compatible with NATO, and on modernizing weaponry, which should also be compatible with NATO equipment. Because of a lack of money, however, we will apparently not be able to reckon with any new weapon systems. The professionalization of the Army will also start. It should be completed in the third stage, when 50 to 60 percent of the Army, including the lowest-level officers' corps, ought to be professionalized. The transformation process should produce a relatively small and well-trained Army, capable of securing the defense of the Republic, predominantly by its own means.

But not all aspects of the transformation process will be easy to master. Professionalization, for example, is running up against the barrier of lack of interest in the lowest commanders' posts (because of poor financial remuneration). Interest in drivers' positions is fair, on the other hand, while interest in participation in the Slovak UN engineering battalion is downright gigantic (25 to 30 applicants for each position). Modernization runs up against the obstacle of a general lack of money, which would be needed for the refurbishment and modernization of barracks, accommodation facilities, and the like.

**Discipline Is a Must**

The democratization and humanization measures introduced in the Army in the years 1991-92 are reflected in slacker discipline among conscripts and in a certain timidity among the officers' corps. The effort to improve the situation has found its expression in a set of measures (which Major General Humaj referred to as "11 commandments") that must be observed—above all, by lowest-level commanders, who have been the Army's weakest link thus far. There has been some improvement in this regard already. This is illustrated by the state of criminality. While the crime rate in society at large is rising, in the ASR it declined in the first half of 1994 (for the first time since 1992). A total of 2,349 military offenses were committed in the ASR in 1993, 1,146 of them in the first half of the year. In the first half of this year, there were only 957 of those. Last year there were 26 extraordinary events (16 of them in the first half of the year); this year there have only been five extraordinary events thus far, and there are many Army units whose soldiers "do completely without" extraordinary events. While hazing has not disappeared from soldiers' lives, it is approximately at last year's level (there were 283 cases in the first half 1993, 259 cases in the second half 1993, and 254 cases so far this year). According to ASR commander General Julius Humaj, military psychologists who would deal with problematic relationships directly in Army units and also with the professionalization of lowest-level commanders would help deal with the problem of hazing. Short-term measures are hardly effective, he said. The Army therefore wants to introduce a certain systemic approach that would fundamentally change existing conditions in the Army and help minimize the number of incidents of hazing. If noncommissioned officers served for three to four years, they would be able to keep an eye on their squads and prevent hazing in them.

## Filkus Discusses Economic, Monetary Issues

*AU3008081794*

[Editorial Report] Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech on 16 August on page 4 carries a 900-word interview with Slovak Finance Minister Rudolf Filkus by Oldrich Zabojnik entitled "Contradictory Assessments of the Economy of the Slovak Republic." Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 18 August on page 9 carries a 1,700-word interview with Rudolf Filkus by Renata Ruzickova entitled "The National Bank Should Put More Money Into Circulation To Increase the Credibility of Commercial Banks." In both interviews, the places and dates of which are not given, Filkus assesses the recent development of the Slovak economy. In the NARODNA OBRANA interview, he also comments on the central bank's monetary policy, the situation in the banking sector, the problem of company insolvency, the need for state supervision of the capital market, and disagreements between the ministers of economy and privatization on privatization methods.

Speaking about the results of the Slovak economy since the present government assumed office, Filkus highlights a number of positive developments. He refers to the fact that "the recession has been slowed down" and "the achievement of zero GDP growth this year appears to be realistic" and notes that the inflationary process "is under control" and that the unemployment rate has "stabilized at a level of about 14 percent," that "Slovakia has an amount of foreign exchange reserves as never before in its history" and that it has turned its former deficit on the clearing account with the Czech Republic into a surplus, which "is proof of the success of barriers that have been erected against unsubstantiated imports." The minister also points out that, unlike the previous Meciar-led government, the present government has obtained a standby credit from the IMF and "the state budget deficit stands at about 8.2 billion korunas [Sk] at present and there is therefore hope that it will be kept within the projected limit of Sk14 billion" by the end of the year. According to Filkus, this is all the more remarkable because last year's deficit had been much higher than the officially reported Sk23 billion, a sum that excluded Sk5.8 billion of Slovak debts on the clearing account with the Czech Republic, Sk1.8 billion worth of debts in health care, and Sk1.2 billion worth of debts in education. The actual state budget deficit for 1993 thus amounted to Sk31.8 billion, Filkus says.

On a more general plane, Filkus observes that the present government is not implementing a "populist" economic policy pursuing short-term objectives but has drawn up a long-term concept "on which any government that comes after us will have to build." Asked what this means specifically, Filkus says: "It means a continuity of steps that clearly lead toward market economy and rule

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

out speculations about a third way. It means the continuation of the restrictive macroeconomic budget policy, the liberalization of prices and privatization, and the sustenance of the internal convertibility of the koruna and preparation for its external convertibility." Filkus also emphasizes the fact that the present government is "depoliticizing all economic processes."

Besides the above positive evaluations, Filkus also makes a number of critical remarks, some of which concern the central bank's policies. He says in this context: "What I personally regard as still uncrystallized is the relationship of the Slovak National Bank [NBS] and the National Property Fund [FNM] toward the state budget. In the Czech Republic, for example, the conditions of whose economy are more favorable, the FNM contributed 13 billion Czech korunas to the state coffers. The mission of the NBS is to maintain the stability of the currency as everywhere under market conditions. To be able to do that, it must avail itself of room for maneuver, must generate reserves and cover its costs. However, it should surrender its entire profit to the state budget. The reality is such that this year we will pay the NBS Sk13 billion in interest on state debts, while the NBS will surrender to the state Sk10.6 billion in profits. But I am an optimist and hope that it will be more."

Filkus also criticizes what he sees as the NBS's excessively restrictive monetary policy. Confronted by NARODNA OBRODA with entrepreneurs' criticism of the dearth of credit funds and high credit interest rates, Filkus says: "We are aware of the criticism by the entrepreneurial sphere not only of the central bank, but of the entire financial sphere. What is in the government's hands? You may have noticed that we have decided on a certain regulation of wages in the banking sector and the insurance business. Such steps do not solve the problems, however. The solution must start with the roof, which is the restrictive macroeconomic budget and monetary policy. I am in favor of Slovakia pursuing the path of macroeconomic restrictions—but only in budget policy, not in monetary policy. This means that the NBS must put substantially more money into circulation. At present, I would not be afraid of fuelling the inflationary process. I think that a greater amount of money in banks would help revive the economy, particularly through small- and medium-sized businesses.

"And now let us move one level below the roof—to commercial banks. It is true that many of their decisions do not meet the strict criteria of ethics and morality, and, to be honest, I am somewhat afraid that, even with a greater volume of resources at their disposal, their present incorrect habits would still manifest themselves. The loan we received from the European Investment Bank [EIB] provides the latest example of that. The EIB granted us capital for the development of small- and medium-sized businesses at an interest rate of 7.5 percent. But our commercial bank has 'maximized' the credit for itself and charges 10.5 percent more for it!"

Filkus concedes that greater competition from foreign banks would help eliminate such abuse. He notes, however, that "foreign banks are not rushing in because they are still worried about political stability in this country and also because they are discouraged by many legislative inadequacies and, often, by very down-to-earth problems. For example, they are unable to acquire suitable buildings for their operations because their owners demand unrealistically high sums."

Asked whether he is not worried that the releasing of a greater volume of money by the NBS would fuel inflation, Filkus says: "First of all, I would like to contest the a priori suspicion that money that would stimulate citizens' and their families' demand would automatically be inflationary money that would all go into consumption. Such a process can be regulated, and it is possible to estimate what amount of money can be released without causing hyperinflation. Do not ask me to name any sum. Such an intervention could be carried out only in a certain relationship to labor productivity. I stress, however, that such a step has not even been contemplated in the government. What we are talking about, also in discussions with NBS functionaries, is releasing greater resources into the banking sphere in order to strengthen the credibility of banks."

In the interview for NARODNA OBRODA, Filkus also touches upon the problems of company insolvency and capital market regulation. Speaking about ways of eliminating company insolvency, Filkus mentions a number of economic instruments that can be applied—writing off irrecoverable claims, providing "softer" tax credits, and, finally, "the radical incision—bankruptcies." He deplores that "for months we have been gathering courage to proceed with bankruptcies, but virtually nothing has happened, despite the fact that almost one-third of state enterprises—31.6 percent—operated at a loss last year."

Referring to the situation on the capital market, where 85 percent of all deals reportedly are direct transactions taking place outside the three stock exchanges, Filkus stresses the need for an "institution of state nature" that would oversee and regulate the market. This institution should protect citizens against middlemen who take advantage of their inexperience and purchase shares from them at undervalued prices, and it should also have overview of investment funds' transactions, he says. Filkus rejects the accusation that such an institution would introduce "nonmarket elements into the capital market," pointing out that, in all "advanced states," there exist "state-run offices" overseeing trading in securities. He also assures the interviewer that he does not want the Ministry of Finance to play this supervisory role.

According to Filkus, the absence of such an institution is a problem the Slovak capital market has in common with the capital markets in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

In conclusion, Filkus is asked about his view of the disagreements between Privatization Minister Janicina and Economy Minister Magvasi about privatization methods. He replies: "To be honest, I am trying to act as an arbitrator between them. What matters is that which we all jointly promised in the policy statement: that we will prepare the next privatization wave and that coupon privatization will represent about one-third of it. And there is yet another thing we promised—that we regard all privatization methods and all entities entering the privatization process as equal. What we promised the citizens on assuming office should be at the top of our priorities, and differences in the professional or political perception of privatization, if any exist, must be subordinated to this."

### Privatization of Power Companies Approved

*LD3008180894 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Excerpts] We can now return to the Slovak Government's itinerant meeting taking place in Dolna Malanta near Nitra today. [passage omitted] Anna Samelova brings more details directly from Dolna Malanta.

[Samelova] Good evening from Dolna Malanta. The government dealt with privatization issues this afternoon. Milan Janicina, minister for the administration and privatization of national property, divided the companies under discussion into three categories.

[Begin recording] [Janicina] First, it is the large power and gas industry. [passage omitted]

[Samelova] Minister, did the government make any decision today on the privatization of a company or a part of some of the companies involved?

[Janicina] Yes, the government ruled on the privatization of the Slovak Power Company [Slovensky Energeticky Podnik] and the East Slovak Power Company [Vychodoslovenske Energeticke Zavody]. We still have to sit down and decide about the Slovak gas industry.

[Samelova] What was, eventually, the government's decision on the privatization method in the case of these companies?

[Janicina] In both of these companies, first, a mother company will be set up, which will subsequently set up subsidiaries.

The allocation of the Slovak Power Company shares reckons with 3 percent for the restitution investment fund, 30 percent for coupon privatization, 51 percent for the National Property Fund—this being bound to the condition that some shareholder rights will be contractually transferred onto the Ministry of Economy so that the state retains some necessary control over the power industry. The remaining 16 percent is earmarked for sale in line with the decision on subsequent privatization.

As for the East Slovak Power Company, 3 percent is allocated to the restitution investment fund, and 25 percent is set aside for coupon privatization—which is less than in the previous company—and 51 percent for the National Property Fund. The remaining part should be privatized on the basis of a subsequent ruling on privatization. [end recording]

[Samelova] I would like to add that the government also approved the report on the conclusion of a contract between the Slovak Republic and the European Investment Bank for a loan to be used for Slovakia's air traffic control. The government authorized Finance Minister Rudolf Filkus to sign the relevant guarantees' contract.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

## Foreign Minister on Conditions for Czech Summit

*LD3108093994 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 0500 GMT 31 Aug 94*

[Excerpts] Prime Minister Klaus is seeking a Hungarian-Czech prime ministerial meeting. This statement was made in Prague where Vaclav Klaus received Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs. However, the Czech premier agreed that such a meeting must be linked to concrete progress in bilateral relations. He also agreed that efforts to integrate into Europe must be coordinated and that our countries need not compete with each other in joining the EU. [passage omitted] Laszlo Kovacs is on the line from Prague. Good morning.

[Kovacs] Good morning.

[Announcer] In the past one could feel some rivalry between Hungary and the Czech Republic, in that both countries treated virtually as a matter of prestige which could join Europe before the other. According to reports on your negotiations, all that is past history now.

[Kovacs] I hope so. We had a detailed discussion on this with Prime Minister Klaus and we agreed that this race, pushing each other out of the way, is totally meaningless. It does not improve our chances of joining the EU, but on the contrary it reduces our image in the eyes of the EU member states. On the other hand, there is a need to coordinate our efforts and to exchange our experiences. It does not mean however, and we agreed on this too, that in the region one country should wait for the other. In other words, that a country in central Europe should not join the EU because it must first wait for others which are not yet ready to join, unable yet to fulfill the conditions of joining.

[Announcer] There is a government in Prague that may be called conservative, whereas the new Hungarian Government's orientation is usually described as socialist-liberal. Did you find on the basis of the negotiations so far that there is a palpable disadvantage resulting from this difference in basic political approach?

[Kovacs] There is none, whatsoever. The Czech side stressed—President Havel, Prime Minister Klaus, and the chairman of the parliament too—that this was the first official visit by a foreign minister since the breakup of Czechoslovakia, the creation of the Czech Republic, and they also emphasized that it was the first official meeting with a representative of the new Hungarian Government. Everyone displayed great interest in and empathy with Hungary and stressed that the ideology-free pragmatic thinking of the new government provided a good possibility for speeding up cooperation and building relations.

[Announcer] Will there be a followup on the demand, formulated by Prime Minister Klaus, for a Hungarian-Czech prime ministerial meeting in the near future?

[Kovacs] Yes, he raised it, although an invitation was extended earlier and indeed Gyula Horn has already replied that he is ready. Prime Minister Klaus has mentioned it again and urged that it should take place as soon as possible. He proposed that we should start preparing for it. However, he agreed that it should be linked to some kind of concrete progress, so that it should not be merely an exchange of views but some kind of advance in relations. He was very open to any proposal which related to specific things. [passage omitted]

## Editorial on Ethnic Hungarians in Romania

*AU3108091494 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 30 Aug 94 p 3*

[Editorial by Endre Aczel: "The Funar-Formula"]

[Text] Given its achievements, the internal development of parliamentary democracy in Romania seems to justify bad premonitions. A new formula is emerging, according to which the ethnic Hungarians living in Romania could after all become hostage to the prevailing balance of forces in parliament, and might also lose even what they think that they received from the dictatorship.

Those who have a different opinion should take a look at the opinion polls on the people's mood which show that the ethnic Hungarians in Romania felt better in certain periods of the Ceausescu-era than in the democracy prevailing since 1990. Obviously because, for the ethnic Hungarians, democracy does not only mean that they can open small businesses and ventures in general if they have money and can transport goods freely; instead, democracy (should) also imply that they can also freely strengthen their awareness as Hungarians. The two things together would be nice. But this is what we miss. The Romanian with whom the ethnic Hungarians cursed Ceasescu together might today laugh at them from Funar's Romanian National Unity Party, and he could get a subsistence credit more easily today, given his status as a member of a founder nation.

In Romania, democracy and the increased nationalism that followed in its wake—something experienced by a lot of other nations undergoing a change of regime—could create a bizarre symbiosis by the fact that the party of the anti-Hungarian mayor of Kolozsvar [Cluj] could join the government. More exactly: The Social Democracy Party of Romania, a party that calls itself a social democratic party (a quasi-sister party to the Hungarian Socialist Party), would have been unable to stay in power without the support of Funar's party.

Of course, I do not want to be assuming the certain moral high ground and be looking down on a case in which a governing party makes a so-called "unprincipled compromise" with a smaller parliamentary party in order to stay in power. There have been such things in history! It is enough to mention the late Austrian Chancellor Kreisky's rather strange flirtation with the Austrian almost neo-fascists.... But Gheorghe Funar is a blushingly unscrupulous politician who made himself famous

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

not only by hurling all the curses of Romanian nationalism at the ethnic Hungarians in Kolozsvar, but also by tolerating, supporting, and even thoroughly "identifying with" the pilot game Caritas [pyramid money- multiplying scheme] for years, a shameless game of deceit that reduced hundreds of thousands of poor people to penury. Unfortunately, the Vacaroiu cabinet, now "enriched" with the representatives of Funar's party, did not have the courage to ban the Caritas game in time. The government only began to carry out arrests and mobilize the state prosecutor when the ultimate failure of this game, something easily predictable mathematically, became obvious and hordes of poor people on hunger strike flooded the entrance to Funar's office. However, this government action from Bucharest came rather late and was even followed by an "acquittal letter", because the party of the strongest supporter of the deceitful Stoica was joining the government at the same time.

After all this, what could increase the hopes of the Hungarians in Romania? Whom should they join in their political activity? Where is there a local partner? Where is there a local ally? The parties that call themselves "national" parties, like Funar's and the Greater Romania Party, cannot be considered from the outset. Similarly, the Hungarians there cannot count on the party of national forces implanted into communists and the communists implanted into national forces. We are left with the liberal-oriented opposition parties, which have made brave statements against the government role played by Funar's party but will not be capable of making decisions on Hungarian issues for some time. In any case, one must deal with the government forces, and the problem with them is that Funar's shadow is now hovering over them.

Such a distorted development is only good to eradicate completely the modern political awareness from the Hungarians (namely the need for ideological and political information), and to replace the emerging hiatus with an increasingly ghetto-style ethnic awareness. In other words, the regime does not allow one who was born Hungarian to choose between socialist, conservative, or liberal; it only allows him to be Hungarian and only cooperate on this basis.

It is interesting that this trend of ethnic collaboration also applies in places with a milder pressure than that prevailing in Romania, such as Slovakia. The political division of the ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia emerged in a very healthy way but, before it could become an exemplary experience, those involved created a definitely ethnically oriented election pact, which, prior to the forthcoming elections, antedates the Hungarians' answer to a Romanian-type "development." (Meciar's return to power)

These problems are also the problems of the present Hungarian Government, namely that it is unimaginable that it will discard the problem of the Hungarian minority forced to live beyond our borders like a worn-out coat or try to "pass it over" to the Romanian or Slovak "fraternal parties." However, given that, among Gyula Horn's partners, Oliviu Gherman's party is governing together with Funar's party and there are serious chances that Peter Weiss's socialists will form a coalition with Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia, my envy of these problems is decreasing with every day that passes.

Nor do I know whether one is deluding oneself slightly when starting from the premise that a parliamentary democracy definitely provides a better chance than a dictatorship for the implementation of the aspirations of national minorities. This chance should obviously be there in the historical perspective, but the current generation will hardly get power from the fact that parliamentary democracy in itself is not a guarantee against conditions in which a parliamentary majority can only be maintained through repeated concessions made to nationalism.

## Coalition Parties Support Growth Measures

*LD3008223394 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Excerpts] The two coalition parties exchanged views regarding economic processes. Differences are only possible in emphasis, Tamas Bauer, SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] economic expert, said after the session of the Coalition Coordination Council. Finance Minister Laszlo Bekesi pointed out that unpopular measures were also necessary for an economic upswing, the conditions for which they wished to create as early as next year.

Both parties support the corrective measures included in the 1994 draft supplementary budget, which can contribute to economic stability and lay the foundations for steady growth, Laszlo Bekesi said. [passage omitted]

Bekesi and Bauer confirmed that there had been no discussion of a property tax.

[Begin recording] [Bekesi] If I have to state for the 20th time, then I do state for the 20th time that there will be no property tax in 1995.

[Bauer] Perhaps I could add that what we discussed was not what kind of new tax should be invented, but how more tax concessions, more tax allowances, could be introduced and asserted in the Hungarian economy. [end recording] [passage omitted]

The government will strive to keep the level of inflation below 20 percent next year. However, domestic consumption should also be reduced to facilitate economic growth. Therefore, they are striving for a wage deal in which the extent of the wage increase would be below the rate of inflation and a maximum 15 percent, Bekesi said.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

## Cuba Strives To Attract Hungarian Investment

*94CH0359B Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 20 Jul 94 p 8*

[Unattributed article: "Cubans To Learn Hungarian Cooking and Confectionery; Tourist Capital Attracted to Cuba"]

[Text] For a long time, Cuba counted as "Hungary's Caribbean colony." At the time of convertible rubles, it was the destination of bonus trips for party cadres and—compared to general circumstances at the time—expensive private vacations. However, after the conversion of trade to dollar accounts, almost all tourism stopped; while more and more well-to-do countries become open toward Castro's country, if the wealthy Hungarian tourist has a desire to visit the area, he ends up in Florida instead.

Perhaps this situation could be changed by the initiative about which we learned from Carlos Trejo, extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of the Republic of Cuba, and Mr. Carnota, consultant of the Cuban Ministry of Tourism. Representatives of the Cubanacan tourism corporation recently held negotiations in Budapest on the future possibilities of concrete Cuban-Hungarian conferences on tourism. They met leaders of the business college, the tourism office, and the Pannonia hotel chain, and they were essentially interested in introducing to the distant island nation the tricks and techniques of Hungarian gastronomy and the confectioner's trade. They said that the Hungarian partners were receptive: The exchange of students, teachers, and curricula alike was discussed.

We learned that especially Italian, Canadian, Colombian, and Argentine investments were considerable in the Cuban tourism sector. On the one hand, the foreign investors take over the operation of already existing hotels; on the other, they build hotels themselves. Later they not only send tourists into these hotels, they also bring the know-how and train specialists. Incidentally, the Ministry of Tourism has only been functioning for two or three months with a very limited staff of 50 or 60. In contrast to its predecessor, Intour, it does not handle issues of personnel, only those of planning. The way they think about Hungary is: Why should they neglect us, when for a long time we had intensive relations, and the "human bridge" can still be traveled? They hope from us not only a market, but also—even if to a humble extent—investments. At any rate, they think it is important for Hungarian investors to at least be informed of the possibility that Cuba is free for all.

For instance, Cubanacan is a private company, and not the only one. Cubanacan's dominant activity is in tourism. It is composed of a number of companies related to tourism: chains of hotels, restaurants, and stores, a travel agency, and a shipping company. The hotel trade is the largest component, and this is not a coincidence: the capital stock of the corporation formed as the first Cuban joint venture comes from the Canary Islands. The majority of the more than 40 hotels has three or four stars, and they employ approximately 15,000 employees. By now, German, Spanish, and Dutch capital is also invested in Cubanacan.

Beyond Cubanacan there are three large hotel chains in the country, and construction goes on constantly. Recently, even the constitution was modified in order to protect foreign investment. (All this is not without preliminaries: The participation of foreign capital in Cuban economy was already regulated by a 1982 decree.) Further security is provided by bilateral agreements which also have the goal of eliminating dual taxation. The Havana government would rather keep the larger portion of shares, but it is not averse to majority shareholding by foreigners on an individual basis. Currently they are concentrating on bringing tourism up to par in the Eastern part of the country, but they would also like to include the virgin, untouched beaches of the surrounding tiny islands into the network of tourism. Development is taking place primarily "above four star level," because most of the guests are coming from the demanding Canada. Beyond that, the majority of last year's 700,000 tourists came from Italy, Germany, Mexico, Holland, Spain, and Argentina, and spent on the average four nights in Cuba.

It is not without reason that tourism is regarded as a growth sector in Cuba: Last year, which was admittedly the most difficult year in the country's history, tourism alone produced a net $236 million of the skimpy $1.7 billion free foreign currency which allows the country to survive. Hungarians who would like to contribute to this "aid" in return for a vacation in the Caribbean in any season can currently apply to Coopturist for a quote.

## Environmental Affairs Committee Head Interviewed

*94CH0375A Budapest TALLOZO in Hungarian 21 Jul 94 pp 1358-1359*

[Interview with Etele Barath, parliamentary representative of the Hungarian Socialist Party and chairman of the parliament's Environmental Protection Committee, by Tamas Frei; broadcast on "Nap TV" program on 13 July 1994: "Other Solutions Are Also Possible"]

[Text] [Frei] Pumps are being installed at Szigetkoz. They are important, because they are going to transfer water from the old Danube to the river basin that has been drying out due to the construction at Bos. This would be fine, except for the fact that these pumps are alleged to be polluting the environment, and their noise levels are also extremely high. Our guest is MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] Representative Etele Barath, chairman of the Environmental Protection Committee of parliament. What should be done about this?

[Barath] The pumping, and most importantly, this kind of pumping operation must go on until we are able to

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

procure a less polluting system, such as a system that operates with electrical pumps.

[Frei] And why did you begin operations with these pumps? Were these the only pumps available?

[Barath] This is a faster and much cheaper solution.

[Frei] How about the recommendations for building a 10-meter-high smoke stack? If I understand the situation correctly, this kind of pump produces nitrogen oxide and pollutes the lower atmosphere. Is there no money available for building such a smoke stack?

[Barath] Other solutions also exist for resolving the water supply problem, or in general, for permanently resolving the problem. The committee is likely to examine all the consequences of this matter, and is also going to recommend different solutions.

[Frei] And for how long will we have to live with a situation in which the pumping of water at Szigetkoz also pollutes the environment?

[Barath] The government will discuss the issue related to Bos-Nagymaros [Bos-Gabcikovo] within a month or two, and will present its recommendations to parliament.

[Frei] Has the newly formed committee heard reactions from people living in Szigetkoz, to the effect that they do not like it this way?

[Barath] No, it has not, but at the first meeting of the Environmental Committee, to which we invited environmentalist organizations, the delayed start of pumping has already been mentioned, and so were the related environmental protection concerns and problems. For this reason we invited to today's committee meeting Regional Prefect Dr. Jozsef Horvath; he was in charge of this entire matter.

[Frei] Is he in charge of the money, or anything else like that?

[Barath] He had the means to start this operation, after obtaining the appropriate permits. But he did not have the means, the kind of money, that could have paid for a modern, less polluting solution.

[Frei] What is the main problem with this solution? Is it the fact that it pollutes the environment, or is it the alleged 130 decibel noise level with which it operates?

[Barath] The fundamental trouble is that we are dealing with environmental protection equipment which itself damages and pollutes the environment. Other concerns also exist; in other word, this could, indeed, be regarded only as a temporary solution.

[Frei] And would the damage be even greater if they halted this operation?

[Barath] That would cause greater damage to plants and to the environment in general.

[Frei] Incidentally, Professor Mosonyi, the spiritual father of the Bos power plant, so to speak, spoke out in conjunction with Bos. He now admits that hoping that the Slovaks would not construct the C-Variant, the one least favorable from our standpoint, was an illusion. At present it is an illusion to pin our hopes to the International Court at The Hague, to trust that they will mandate the Slovaks to do something. So that at this point some bilateral negotiations with the Slovaks should be initiated. Do you agree with this statement?

[Barath] So much so, that so far as I know, these bilateral talks, which test and prepare the ground, have already begun with the involvement of various professionals.

[Frei] Were these talks spontaneously initiated by the professionals?

[Barath] Well, not spontaneously, but at the initiative of various political parties. It is extremely important from the standpoint of the coalition to resolve, as soon as possible, this financially, politically, and environmentally protracted concern. We must, of course, continue with the court hearings at The Hague. But our concern is not limited to the fact that they might not admonish anyone, we are also concerned about the fact that the process is likely to take a long time, and meanwhile the Slovaks may complete their work by taking advantage of every other solution. In other words, we may be confronted with a fully accomplished fact.

[Frei] Why would negotiations with the Slovaks begin at this time? Would they begin because the new coalition is making an initiative to that effect, and the old coalition did not want this to happen, or do we have a situation today which causes the Slovaks to talk to us, so to speak?

[Barath] This has very many component factors. And it is quite natural that since a certain change in government, and a fundamental change in political outlook has occurred in Hungary, a new commencement, or, in a given situation, a continuation of negotiations has become possible. And I trust that this raises hopes for a quicker resolution.

[Frei] One reads in the Slovak press that a flood threatens Slovakia if the dams and Dunakiliti and Dunacsuny operate simultaneously. In other words, they now sense danger. Could this card could be played, so to speak?

[Barath] There always have been movements and experts who expressly opposed the operation of this entire establishment; later on they specifically opposed the C-Variant for political reasons. I do not believe that we should be considering playing certain cards in this regard, instead, we should present rational, professional arguments to reconcile the issues with the Slovak partners.

[Frei] You are here as the chairman of the environmental protection committee, but we are aware of the fact that until the final day of the coalition negotiations, you were

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

slated to become the minister for environmental protection. In the end, the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] torpedoed this idea. What is your reaction?

[Barath] I never made a statement to any newspaper as a future minister.

[Frei] The seventeenth of July, MAGYAR HIRLAP, your perceptions.

[Barath] Perceptions relative to what?

[Frei] If you were the minister for environmental protection.

[Barath] You must read that report. I did not say that I would work as minister for environmental protection. Instead, I stated what tasks would have to be considered and performed under given conditions. From a practical standpoint, I always removed myself from any state administrative task. I asked them not to count on me. I followed this line of thought to the last day of the coalition negotiations, and this is what has taken place, and this is what I agreed upon with chairman Gyula Horn. Only the next morning did I agree to become a candidate for that post, in response to his personal request.

[Frei] Why did he insist on your candidacy?

[Barath] I believe that he did so because the ministry has a number of functions—such as regional development, construction—I dealt with as a state secretary in the days of the Miklos Nemeth government. On the other hand, I am greatly concerned about environmental protection. Based on these considerations it appeared as natural—and I believe this was also true insofar as the party leadership was concerned—that they would ask me to serve in that position.

[Frei] My original question was this: What did you have to say when, in the end, the SZDSZ torpedoed this thing?

[Barath] Even today, I fail to understand this situation. They did not contact me. From what I heard, the SZDSZ asserted that I had some conflicts with the green movements in conjunction with the exposition, and that these conflicts would not make me a truly likable person.

[Frei] Information received from SZDSZ circles indicates that the trouble was that as a result of your activities as chief commissioner for the exposition they regarded you clearly as an environmental polluter, as an anti-environmentalist.

[Barath] Well, this is interesting. I think I should obtain more detailed information. I would be pleased if they visited my home, if they paid a visit to my garden. If they found these to be environmental polluters, I am sure, many people would be happy to live in that environment. The other aspect of this matter is that my profession of being an architect, involves an activity that is rather friendly to the environment. Accordingly, I believe that this accusation must have originated from someone out of control. Anyone who reads the articles and studies I wrote during the past 20-25 years, or reviews the plans I prepared, will find that all of these were spiced with a certain holistic or ecological viewpoint. I also wrote my doctoral thesis about regional systems, and I viewed these as environmental systems.

[Frei] What is the difference between serving as a minister for environmental protection or as chairman of the environmental protection committee in parliament? Accordingly, if the green movements—and at this point we should not talk about the SZDSZ—have some concern about you serving as minister, why should they not be concerned about you serving as chairman of the committee?

[Barath] I am very pleased that the rather large number of environmental protection organizations and leading personalities present at the initial committee meeting made no remarks of gestures of this nature. I believe that we began our work in absolute openness, and with absolute tolerance toward each other. Most likely, however, a minister might have a more direct and immediate impact on certain decisions due to his responsibility for making important proposal, due to his governmental work. This may sound odd: From this standpoint the parliament is a bit more democratic an organization, because here the decisions are made by committees.

[Frei] In the end, Ferenc Baja accepted his nomination as minister, and the next day he met with the leaders of green movements. Don't you regard this as a message involving your person?

[Barath] Obviously, since three days later I met with them at the initial committee meeting. On the other hand, I believe that this is rather natural, because environmental protection activities may be performed totally only on the basis of social cooperation, and with the involvement of society. This then actually presumes the existence of a populist culture, and not an administrative act.

[Frei] If I understand this matter correctly, as chairman of the committee you intend to change the activities of the environmental protection committee somewhat, and intend to establish subcommittees. Why?

[Barath] This is not only my intention, but also the intent of the committee members, the representatives. Regional development, construction, caring for historic places, the protection of nature, etc. have been under the jurisdiction of the environmental protection committee before. I regard it as natural to deal with these concerns jointly. In addition, the committee proposed last week, and a decision is going to be made today, to assume jurisdiction over foreign tourism. And since both regional development and environmental protection are endangered on the one hand, and use the infrastructure to provide solutions, on the other, we, too, along with other committees, wish to deal with issues pertaining to

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

the infrastructure. For this reason we also invited minister designate Karoly Lotz to this committee meeting, in addition to minister designate Ferenc Baja.

[Frei] Would you like to increase the weight of the committee, so to speak? I am asking this question because the impression laymen received during the past four years was that the environmental protection committee did not weigh heavily.

[Barath] The problem is that during the past four years they regarded environmental protection as something that wastes money, a virtually superfluous thing. They said: okay, while clean air, and good health are very important matters, we do not have money for that purpose at this time, and we do not have time to act. I happen to believe that modern civil societies have proved that the environmental protection industries constitute a leading branch of industry in their respective economies. They provided proof that the essential activity in environmental protection is prevention. Accordingly, in this field we must deal not only with issues like charging product fees and similar things, so that funds produced by fees are available and can be used later for salvaging purposes, but we must also resolve this matter in a complex fashion, from the outset. If society receives an education based on this outlook from childhood on, and witnesses conduct of this nature, it will adopt this kind of outlook and conduct. I believe that we can accomplish a qualitative change in the use of the environment in the course of the next five to 10 years.

[Frei] You just said that this involves a five- to 10-year-process. Why then did you suddenly state that you would run for the post of lord mayor of Budapest?

[Barath] Well, to be frank, I was not the one who said that. This was a request, and in this regard there are some serious debates going on in various MSZP base organizations.

[Frei] But would you accept the nomination?

[Barath] I would accept the nomination, of course. Let me say this: Few positions require activities based on a more complex outlook than positions of mayors, in general.

## Changes in Office of Refugee Affairs Reported

*94CH0381C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 28 Jul 94 p 4*

[Article by Lajos Kovacs: "Morvay Unable To Make Decision on Refugee Camp Costs"]

[Text] As we reported earlier, the Socialist-Free Democrat government coalition will integrate the Office for Refugee Affairs and Immigration, and amend the decree that created the office. At the same time, it will dissolve the honorary government-level position of state secretary for refugee affairs.

Istvan Morvay, who as honorary state secretary ran the refugee office made "independent" of the ministry last year, has told us that he considered the integration of the refugee affairs office into the Interior Ministry to have been a good move. As he pointed out, the statutory regulation did not allow him to play any role in the establishment and operation of the refugee receiving stations in the capacity of honorary state secretary. The government decree contained loopholes with respect to his status. Yet the concerns he raised about it were in vain: Even the proposal he had drafted for the prime minister during the tenure of the Boross government aimed at resolving what he called a situation of contradictions. Regarding the disciplinary action taken against him, Morvay said that it had never gone beyond the inquiry stage. Precisely because the loopholes left him with none of the authority or responsibilities he was alleged to have had according to the most serious charges against him. The case in point was the Debrecen refugee camp, which when completed turned out to have cost five times the original estimate. According to Morvay, it was he who upon seeing the cost overruns had launched an investigation.

The former honorary state secretary thus has dismissed Interior Ministry claims according to which the disciplinary action taken against him was suspended as a result of the transition of power and the fact that his tenure as state secretary expired. Morvay attributed the causes of the action against him to serious personnel tensions and his outspoken stand in the ministry against certain "disturbing economic tendencies." Also designed to silence him was the extension, on as many as three occasions, of the investigation against him, which he alleged was without any legal basis.

## New Cabinet Chief's Role, Background, Goals

*94CH0381B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 28 Jul 94 p 4*

[Unattributed article: "State Administration More Sluggish, Says Cabinet Chief Piroska Apro"]

[Text] If there is such a thing as a position of trust, this one is it. Piroska Apro, Prime Minister Gyula Horn's cabinet chief, has known the prime minister for a long time. In the Nemeth government, where Horn served as foreign minister, she worked as deputy minister of foreign trade between 1988 and 1990. In the past four years, while working in the private sector, she worked with an advisory group close to Horn.

She assumed the cabinet office following Prime Minister Horn's trips to Trieste and Bonn. Her first observation is that state administration has become more sluggish, possibly due in part to the nature of the transition process as well as to the shaken sense of job security among some officials. She also noticed—and this may also be related to the above factors—that the prestige of administering the affairs of state has declined. "If we are

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

to build a viable state apparatus," she said, "we will have to reverse these unfavorable tendencies."

As far as her own area of responsibilities is concerned, she believes that the Horn government will need a more viable and more modern apparatus than that of its predecessor, and that such an apparatus cannot be created on the basis of prestige-related considerations. The division of responsibilities between the Prime Minister's Office and the cabinet chief is clearly defined. Under the leadership of State Secretary Elemer Kiss, the former coordinates the activities of the government as a whole. The cabinet chief, on the other hand, will coordinate the meetings and contacts of only the prime minister, working at the helm of an office with a scaled back staff of not more than 30 people. So this is a very clearly drawn up structure. This cabinet office is quite different from its predecessor, which through its press work even encompassed the National Information Office.

One of the cabinet chief's stated goals is to run an "open cabinet office." This means that she intends to establish meaningful and genuine relationships for Gyula Horn with the broadest possible segments of society, with young people and pensioners, the churches, trade unions, and private entrepreneurs. Her aim is to provide the prime minister not just with filtered information, but also with first-hand experiences. This necessarily implies that a wide spectrum of expert sources will need to be consulted for objective opinions on matters that the prime minister must make decisions on, stressed the cabinet chief.

## Explosives in Budapest, Subotica 'Identical'

*94CH0381A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 28 Jul 94 p 4*

[Article by Gy. Attila Fekete: "Heightened Security at More Important Public Buildings"]

[Text] Bombs of identical chemical composition went off in Subotica, Szeged, at the parliament, and in front of the Mathias Cathedral, said Major General Antal Kacziba, director general for criminal affairs of the ORFK [National Police Headquarters], citing the results of tests conducted at a special laboratory of the National Security Office [NBH]. The task force, formed to coordinate the investigations into the bombing attacks perpetrated in Hungary, held its first meeting on Wednesday at the ORFK center. Members of the group include representatives from the military and civilian intelligence agencies, the police, the border guard, and customs service. The task force will meet daily to evaluate the information collected by the various services. They will work collectively to define the tasks of the various investigative authorities in order to prevent any duplication of efforts or the inadvertent exposure of one another's informants.

After the meeting, Kacziba announced that the police and the NBH had received a great number of "promising" leads. Evaluating them may take several months. For now, the investigative authorities have not ruled out any explanations; they have not excluded the possibility that a terrorist group of unknown intentions may be behind the bombings, nor the notion that the explosions are the workings of a deranged individual....

In view of the increased threat of terrorist activities, at its statutory meeting the task force ordered the heightening of security at all buildings which may be the targets of the unknown bomber.

As the police are unable to provide security for all such buildings, Kacziba requests the help of civilian guards, armed civilian security guards, and local governments. The director general also expressed his gratitude to the media for sharing information at its disposal that it thought would be helpful with the investigative authorities.

At the same time, he pleaded for patience for not disclosing detailed information about the status of the investigation in the interest of success later. (Starting on Wednesday, only General Kacziba may speak about the case.)

Regarding the issue of the repatriation of the Jewish Museum's treasures, he stated that date of arrival of the ecclesiastical objects would not be announced, and that if the date should be accidentally divulged a new date would be set for bringing the objects home. As he put it, it would not be prudent to transport billions of forints' worth of treasures home in full public view.

## Basic Principles of Media Law Discussed

*94CH0380A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 28 Jul 94 p 4*

[Unattributed article: "Basic Questions To Consider in Drafting the Media Law; Should the State Be Handing Out Free Radio Stations? Should It Subscribe to Two Dailies for Everyone?"]

[Text] The committee appointed by the government to draft a media law has recently submitted a series of questions—including its own preliminary position—to representatives of the parties, media chiefs, and special interest organizations connected with the profession regarding the basic principles to be included in the statutory regulation. Next week those affected will hold meetings on these issues to reconcile their positions.

In its document the committee makes it clear at the outset that "the aim of the law is to establish the legal guarantees necessary to guarantee the freedom of information people need to form independent opinions; foster freedom of expression in the electronic media; and prevent the formation of information monopolies that threaten those freedoms." Thus the statutory regulation must establish oversight over public radio, television, and the news agencies, and lay down procedures for licensing commercial radio and television stations. At the same time, the committee is of the opinion that

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

beyond the issues of oversight and appointment, the law does not need to deal with the news agencies. The question is whether or not all of these issues need to be taken care of within the scope of a single law, or whether oversight over the public service media should mean exclusive state control.

The committee feels that in order to prevent monopolies from forming the law must also address issues pertaining to frequency regulation. At the same time (as long as they do not pose a threat to pluralism) this should not mean that the concentration of capital necessary for the commercial media to remain viable would also have to be restricted. According to the committee, official (studio) permits issued earlier cannot be invalidated or be changed with the aim to curtail rights. Future applications for programming permits should not have to conform to a prescribed set of mandatory criteria, although it is recommended that certain cultural preferences be allowed to assert themselves.

One of the interesting questions raised has to do with the scope of the state's welfare service responsibilities. Do they include having to make every state-sponsored program accessible to everyone, and to ensure that they are, to provide a modern radio set free of charge at least to those who cannot afford one? On this issue the committee's comment was that "if nothing more, it would surprise those who would rather receive bread from the state. If the aim of providing assistance is to 'create' a well-informed citizen capable of making political decisions, why not have the state subscribe to two dailies for its citizens instead?"

The preparatory committee believes that state radio and television are obligated to provide complete, balanced, and unbiased information only to the extent that the many-faceted competitive information system fails to provide it. At the same time, the state cannot allow a situation to develop in which lacking market conditions prevent the balanced reporting of information from materializing. Steps must be taken to bring into the marketplace views, means of expression, and cultural values that are unable to manifest themselves through the regular market mechanism. If this should require disproportionately great expenditures, then the state media's air time will have to be used for this purpose. The committee makes it clear: "It is not logical to expect the state to carry out the public service responsibilities of telecommunications where there are other providers to do so." In any case, even where programming is owned and maintained by the state it must be ensured that the institution does not become economically dependent on the state.

## Local Governments Said To Support Danube Dam

*94CH0378B Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 28 Jul 94 pp 1-2*

[Article by Attila Lenart: "Gyula Horn Prepares for Bratislava; Coordination With Environmentalists About Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The government convened environmental organizations before Horn's Bratislava [Pozsony] negotiations in order to coordinate their views. However, it was actually impossible to coordinate views, because representatives of all 67 organizations wanted to explain their positions, and they attacked each other instead of holding a genuine discussion.

In his introduction, Environmental Minister Ferenc Baja refuted the idea that he wanted to use the forum to legitimate some sort of an already existing decision. He pointed out that at the news conference held by the opposition on Tuesday, the vice chairman of the Association of Young Democrats [Fidesz] announced that Horn would participate in the negotiations with previously given authorizations, and therefore the negotiations were senseless. In Ferenc Baja's opinion, the cabinet would make a decision only one day before the meeting, on 4 August, about the position Horn should represent in Pozsony.

Following him, E. Csaba Kiss, on behalf of the Theresatown [part of Pest] Greens, called the issue of the dam a political one, and in his opinion one must come to an agreement with the Slovaks even if this meant building Nagymaros. In his opinion, sooner or later both power plants would be dismantled, because they were inefficient. Pal Farkas, member of the Danube Circle, explained in his remarks that it was impossible to lead a genuine discussion at the forum, and therefore they would not elaborate professional matters there, but they requested the government to consult them before the negotiations.

Vilmos Kiszela from the Gonczol Foundation called stopping construction in Nagymaros and Dunakiliti, as well as dissolving the treaty, a good decision. Laszlo Juhos, chairman of the Realistic Green Club, promoted returning to the treaty and constructing Nagymaros.

In his calm remarks Gabor Vida, member of the Academy, offered to help the government with his advice. In his opinion we should either follow the road to The Hague, or we should build Nagymaros. A medium course only existed in the imagination of water management people.

Representatives of local governments from the area of Nagymaros also took part in the forum. They all said that local residents supported building the power plant, or at least wanted the assurance of an adequate water supply for the Szigetkoz area. They referred to local survey data, based on which they asserted that approximately 80 percent of local residents were in favor of the power plant. They requested that representatives of local governments be included in the coordinating meetings, whatever decision would be made.

In his short speech at the end of the forum, Horn did not explain the government's exact ideas on the matter of Gabcikovo [Bos]. He offered to meet representatives of the Greens before the Pozsony meeting. He refuted that

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

there was a water management lobby behind the government, and as his goal he again named finding a compromise. He said he did not believe that The Hague would unequivocally support Hungary in its decision. Moreover, the verdict would not be announced for another three years. As he said: This was our problem, and no one else could solve it for us.

### Environmentalists Oppose Government on Dam

*94CH0378A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 27 Jul 94 pp 1, 3*

[Article by A. Janos Szilagyi: "Government Discusses Gabcikovo With Greens Today"]

[Excerpts] Both the opposition parties and the Danube Circle, a conglomerate of environmental movements concerned with the Danube, protest the government's policy on Gabcikovo [Bos] aimed at finding a compromise. Ferenc Baja, head of the environmental portfolio, thinks that their worries are unfounded, because it has not yet been decided what position Gyula Horn will take at his impending visit to Bratislava [Pozsony] on the matter of Bos. Representatives of the government—according to prior information, headed by Gyula Horn—will coordinate their position with experts of the green movements today.

"The normalization of Hungarian-Slovak relations and the issue of the basic bilateral treaty was on the agenda of the previous government already. The improvement of bilateral relations is an urgent task from which the issue of Bos cannot be excluded," Ferenc Baja, environmental and area development minister, said in defense of putting the resolution of the power plant problem on the agenda so expeditiously. "Gyula Horn will meet the Slovak prime minister on 5 August, and at the negotiations in Pozsony he must present a ready, acceptable position," added the head of the environmental portfolio.

According to those who oppose the government's ideas about the dams, the change of government cannot be a reason for a change in the policy on the power plants. In connection with this Baja noted that previous decisions cannot be regarded to be entirely without fault. For instance, the water replacement in Szigetkoz, where an insufficient amount of water is pumped into the branches of the river in a highly polluting manner, is a questionable solution. In his opinion, the government must realistically confront the problems and negotiate with the Slovaks; it must find a compromise, rather than fight a senseless political war of attitudes.

There is no decision yet about the compromise, about the concrete issues in which the government wants a new agreement with Pozsony. At its first session the government only decided that while it intended to uphold the appeal to The Hague, it would begin negotiations with Slovakia on the matter of Bos. On Monday the portfolios concerned in the matter—foreign affairs, water management, and environment—presented their materials concerning the issue. Today's forum, which was organized to include environmental organizations, also serves the purpose of forming a position to be presented in Pozsony. "The point is not that they want to legitimate an already prepared secret decree with the help of the green movements," the Socialist minister asserted.

To the question whether the planned compromise included putting the reservoir completely or partially into operation, Baja told MAGYAR HIRLAP that arriving at a solution that would offer mutual advantages required a complex way of thinking. Putting the dam into operation was mentioned at the coordinating meeting between the portfolios on Monday, but a final position has not yet been formed about the reservoir, either.

The Danube Circle recently expressed harsh criticism about the government's ideas of a compromise in the matter of Bos. Spokesman Janos Vargha informed MAGYAR HIRLAP that they demanded steps corresponding to parliamentary decisions still in force. After a period of many postponements and omissions, they expect a broader, more active international policy so that processes that harm the environment could be slowed down even before a decision is made in The Hague.

"Putting the Dunakiliti dam into operation would greatly weaken Hungary's chances in The Hague, and it would not help the Szigetkoz area, either. The region's problems can only be solved by allowing the Danube to return into its original bed. In the course of ecological rehabilitation all mistakes caused by the construction of the dam must be corrected," said Janos Vargha, describing the Danube Circle's position.

The Danube Circle noted the lack of a study on technological rehabilitation based on the Hungarian position, even though a parliamentary decision of April 1991 demanded one. The Danube Circle expects the new government to make up for this omission before the end of the year.

"So far, Pozsony did not exhibit any good will," Vargha pointed out on the occasion of the impending meeting of the Hungarian and Slovak prime ministers. The unfavorable experiences also underscore that whichever way the matter is settled, even if the decision does not correspond to the expectations of environmentalists in every respect, a guarantee is necessary, and it can only be provided by a position from The Hague.

In spite of its reservations about today's forum, the Danube Circle will take part in the meeting. However, they are afraid that the great number and the mixed composition of the participants will hinder a real exchange of views. Their expectation of the forum is that after contradictory prior statements, the portfolios involved in the issue of the dam and the prime minister will make their position unequivocal. [passage omitted]

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

One should not seek a compromise; rather, following the recommendation of the European Union, the Hungarian and Slovak prime ministers should negotiate a temporary water-sharing plan at their meeting. To put the Dunakiliti reservoir in operation and to withdraw the appeal to The Hague would be an irreparable mistake, representatives of the opposition parties in parliament maintained at their joint news conference.

The change of government did not create a new situation, as far as the dam was concerned. Hungary must continue to negotiate with the Slovaks on the basis of parliamentary decisions still in force, argued Parliamentary Representatives Andras Kelemen and Janos Szabo for the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], specialist Peter Farkas for the Christian Democratic Peoples' Party [KDNP], and Vice Chairman Zoltan Illes for the Association of Young Democrats [Fidesz]. According to the opposition parties, the agreement planned for the 5 August meeting between Horn and Moravcik serves the purpose of diverting attention from internal problems. Instead of a hasty compromise entered into without social consensus, in terms of the recommendation of the European Union, while upholding the appeal to The Hague, the government should negotiate with Slovakia about a water sharing plan which is more favorable for the Szigetkoz area.

Janos Szabo thought that one should wait for the decision of the international court; unilateral concessions could result in irreparable damages. Peter Farkas urged a six-party parliamentary consensus in the matter of Bos instead of a government decision. The vice chairman of FIDESZ protested the plan of putting the Dunakiliti reservoir into operation. The inefficiency of the power plant system was proved a long time ago, and therefore it was incomprehensible why the government was considering new decisions. Illes said it was a pity that it was primarily the prime minister and the foreign ministry who made decisions about Bos and not the environmental portfolio.

Yesterday, the Social Chamber published an opinion similar to that of the opposition parties in a statement directed at Gyula Horn and Environmental Minister Ferenc Baja. Based on decisions by its 46 national organizations, the chamber thought that by ignoring realities and disregarding the limits to the country's means, the issue of the dam was once again treated as a political issue. The Social Chamber demanded a decision based on a study on technological, economic, and realistic environmental effects to be prepared by an international team of professionals. Should the government want to make a decision which involved assuming considerable burdens without such a study, the organization proposed holding a referendum.

An international protest assembly was being planned for 22 October at the Bos power plant, Bela Liptak, director of the Hungarian Environmental Protection Fund announced yesterday in Washington. The purpose of the protest assembly was to draw attention to the damage to nature in the Szigetkoz area, and to the bad condition of the Bos power plant.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

## Milczanowski's Appearance Before Sejm Viewed

*WS3108112994 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 31 Aug 94 p 1*

[Article by Jerzy Jachowicz: "Sejm Deputies on Zacharski Case; The Minister Was Reprimanded"]

[Text] Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski promised Sejm deputies that the nomination of the next candidate, after Marian Zacharski, for chief of the intelligence service would be discussed with the president and the prime minister. Though the deputies criticized him, they did not submit a motion that a no-confidence vote be held.

Thus, the storm that two weeks ago was caused by the decision by the internal affairs minister to appoint Marian Zacharski as chief of the civilian intelligence service is beginning to die down. Zacharski was a superspy of the intelligence services of the Polish People's Republic, who in the 1970's stole a great deal of invaluable military information from the Americans. Despite the objections raised by many politicians and segments of society, as well as an exceptionally vehement reaction by Washington, including an official demarche, Milczanowski earlier tried to defend this controversial nomination.

The minister underscored his regret that Zacharski would not head the intelligence services. He promised, however, that, in the future, he would consult with the president and with the prime minister on any candidates for the heads of the intelligence and counterintelligence services, even though the law on the Office of State Protection [UOP] does not envision this. The committee decided that it would ask the prime minister to appropriately change the regulations so that the minister would have to make such consultations.

Milczanowski said that he had kept defending Zacharski's candidacy against UOP Director Gromoslaw Czempinski. Thus, he unofficially confirmed that, by introducing "his own man," he wanted to regain the lost control over UOP.

Milczanowski revealed that he had asked the FBI chief to lift the embargo for traveling in some West European states, which was imposed on Zacharski in the past. As is known, he cannot go to the United States, where he was given a life sentence.

The head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] told me yesterday that "Zacharski will remain in the special services but on a position that is not so much in the limelight."

### I Can Go...

Deputies of the Democratic Left Alliance praised the ministry. However, the opposition criticized it for appointing people linked to the former Security Service to high-level posts. Why have new young cadres not been prepared and trained over the past four years?, asked Ryszard Bugaj of the Union of Labor. Milczanowski replied that former officers are experts.

Jan Olszowski of the Freedom Union, who became irritated, shouted out: "In a moment you will say that Kiszczak can also be hired!" "Kiszczak has already headed the MSW and has also been a deputy prime minister in the Mazowiecki government," Milczanowski replied.

The minister repeated several times: "I am ready to go on one day's notice, without anyone's pressure, if I hear the president, the government, or the committee say that I do not have enough skills."

### MSW After Zacharski

"Has the Zacharski case strengthened or weakened your position?," I asked Minister Milczanowski. "The need to submit information at a session of the Council of Ministers, the meeting with the president, and, finally, the session of the committee—these are problems," he answered. "It is always better when one does not have to justify oneself, when he has nothing to justify himself for... This is what I think about it, frankly. I emphasize, I often emphasize: I am at your disposal."

I also asked the MSW deputy ministers what the consequences of the Zacharski case are for the ministry. Zbigniew Sobotko refused to answer, saying that "he had also partially participated in the making of the decision." Jerzy Zimowski refused to answer and did not say anything.

The first signal suggesting that "the Zacharski case no longer exists" came on Monday, when the minister and the president decided to accept Zacharski's resignation. As we have learned from circles close to the Belweder, the president argued that the pressure from U.S. politicians did not end with the demarche.

## High-Level Consultation on Appointment Promised

*LD3008162594 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1500 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[Text] The Sejm administration and internal affairs commission will ask the prime minister to hold consultations before making appointments to important state posts. It also wants to speed up work on a special commission that will supervise the secret services and to exclude the State Protection Office [UOP] from the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The UOP will be under the prime minister.

I personally regret that circumstances did not allow Marian Zacharski to be the head of the intelligence service, Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski told the deputies. He also confirmed that Zacharski was his candidate. According to present regulations, Milczanowski did not have to hold consultations regarding this

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

appointment. The minister said that on Thursday he would present two candidates for the post of the chief police commandant to the political advisory committee attached to the Interior Ministry. These candidates are Boguslaw Strzelecki and Leszek Lamparski.

After the meeting, Milczanowski gave assurances that the president and prime minister would be consulted about the new candidate for the head of intelligence.

## Walesa's Moves Discussed; Politicians Comment

*WS3008120094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 30 Aug 94 pp 1-2*

[Article by Piotr Adamowicz, Ewa K. Czaczkowska, Kazimierz Groblewski, and Ewa Kaszuba: "President Announces Changes, Politicians Comment; Walesa for New Times"]

[Text] Marian Zacharski will not be chief of the intelligence services of the Office of State Protection [UOP]. Andrzej Milczanowski will remain in his post; Mieczyslaw Wachowski is not fit to be head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW]. It is still not known what exactly will happen with regard to reorganization in the President's Chancellery. Andrzej Drzycimski will no longer be Lech Walesa's spokesman.

Last night the president met with Andrzej Milczanowski, who briefed him on the situation in the police and special services. He also reported that Marian Zacharski reaffirmed his resignation from the post of chief of UOP's intelligence services; thus, the nomination "does not have to be discussed any further." Also discussed at the meeting were candidates for the post of police commandant.

"We cannot go against other countries. Poland needs the understanding of its partners, including the great ones. Therefore, we cannot do things in spite of them. Now, in a nation of 40 million people, there certainly are specialists who can work in the intelligence services," said Lech Walesa before the meeting. "The president did not meddle with cadre issues," but, from now on, "so that the interest of Poland is not jeopardized, cadre issues will have to be discussed in a larger circle." According to the president, Milczanowski should remain head of the MSW, and Mieczyslaw Wachowski is not fit to fill this position. "Neither Minister Wachowski nor I feels like doing this," said Walesa. Lech Walesa was also asked about changes in the President's Chancellery and in his closest circle of advisers. "My moves correspond to the challenges of the times. Therefore, there have been and will continue to be various changes. The Presidential Chancellery must be reoriented and reorganized. I will not want to reject anyone who has proved himself; I have made too many enemies of my friends," said Walesa. Some of the aides "understand that I will have to reorient certain things, to work on other issues. Some of them will understand. Those who do not will have to go." Walesa admitted that he was looking for new aides; he did not say, however, which posts he had in mind, nor did he answer the question of what exactly the reorganization of his chancellery will entail.

"When Andrzej Drzycimski gets bored with his home and wife, he may come back to work, even the day after tomorrow." However, he will not be the president's spokesman: "As a historian, he may document the 14-year struggle for freedom. We are also organizing the Jozef Pilsudski museum. He may also be a minister," Walesa speculated.

"I did not take the leave. I was told to do so. I have no official information on my recall or on my status. I am learning about all of these new developments from the mass media," Andrzej Drzycimski told RZECZPOSPOLITA with regard to the above-quoted statement.

Asked what advice he would give to the Freedom Union [UW], which is hesitating about whether to field Hanna Suchocka or Jacek Kuron as its presidential candidate, Walesa replied: Lech Walesa.

### President Adapted

"We make different preparations before the summer and different ones before winter." "One must adapt oneself to new tasks," the president explained while speaking about the reasons behind Andrzej Drzycimski's departure. We asked politicians what they expect of Lech Walesa in the near future. What will he do to regain social support, to enhance his chances of winning the elections? What advice would they give Walesa?

Tomasz Nalecz of the Union of Labor cannot predict any further moves by the president because he is as unstable as the weather in March. For the time being, we are witnessing the beginning of personnel changes. Because the president has for a long time now not conducted any real policy, he will keep on trying to surprise the public with personnel changes. He will probably use the posts in his entourage to try to...

### Bribe the Right Wing

In the meantime, all of these activities will prove to be in vain because Lech Walesa is not in a position to win another campaign, Nalecz claims. He would stand a chance if other candidates proved even worse. However, this is not very likely.

In addition, Jerzy Szmajdzinski of the Democratic Left Alliance admits that he has difficulties trying to predict Lech Walesa's next move. "Even such an expert interpreter of the president's thoughts as Andrzej Drzycimski ended his career because even he did not catch up with their course and could not convey them to the people precisely enough," he adds.

"The personalities in the President's Chancellery have already been used up, and we expect that they will be replaced with new faces, which may not cease to be attractive until the elections. Thanks to this move, the

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

support for the president may increase by 2 or 3 percent," Szmajdzinski says, and he does not rule out any further changes. He does not really expect any other moves. He does not want, however, to tell Lech Walesa what he should do to win the next election. But perhaps... The key to an efficient presidency in the complex Polish reality is not a change in the program but a change in the method of conducting policy.

**The President Will Not Be Able To Change This...**

...because he is not in a position to change himself, to understand that Poland needs cohabitation, that people of various political orientations will hold various positions.

Janusz Piechocinski of the Polish Peasant Party claims that the president will have grave difficulties finding a candidate to replace Drzycimski, a candidate who would have substantive knowledge and political support. "Unless Lech Walesa finds a good successor to Drzycimski, he will abandon further personnel changes. It is an attempt to find out whom he will attract. There is no real enthusiasm to be seen in those who, from Walesa's standpoint, are the most useful." According to Piechocinski, the changes in the President's Chancellery will probably be finished; they will certainly...

**Not Affect Mieczyslaw Wachowski**

Walesa will cause new conflicts on purpose—to recreate the clear division between post-August [1980] Poland and the Polish People's Republic. This will be the main element of Walesa's presidential campaign. "The president knows that he can win over conservative voters, for whom anticommunist slogans are important. To achieve this, he will keep heading for clashes with the left, which is trying to 'finally kill' post-August Poland," Piechocinski believes.

UD's Bronislaw Komorowski believes that changes in the immediate entourage of the president will depend not only on where Lech Walesa looks for partners for the period of the election campaign but also on....

**Where He Will Find Them**

"The past has shown that the direction of the president's changes was sometimes difficult to predict. It is possible that he may also now make some surprising decisions."

"An element that always makes the authority of the head of state more credible is a certain stability in his entourage, stability of the office and political stability," says Komorowski, who stresses that the president's personnel decisions and changes in the political shape of the Chancellery would be more credible if they were not made for the needs of the presidential campaign.

Janusz Korwin-Mikke of the Union for Real Politics [UPR] believes that the president will...

**Fight With Parliament**

...and veto all leftist draft laws. What will he gain by doing that? "It depends on the strength of the nerves of right-wing politicians—whether they will start supporting him in that or not."

Asked what the president should do to enhance his chances of winning the elections, the UPR leader gave a brief answer: "In my opinion, he has no chance. However, I will not tell him what he ought to do, not for free anyway."

"The problem that President Lech Walesa is facing is whether he will have enough time to regain at least part of the support he had in the previous election campaign," says Romuald Szeremietiew, leader of the Movement for the Republic [RdR].

According to Szeremietiew, first of all Lech Walesa should "change his entourage." "Mieczyslaw Wachowski particularly has become everyone's pain in the neck," he says. The president must also "work out a new concept of influencing the people; he must credibly explain.... why he has not kept the promises made during the election campaign."

"It is a difficult task," says the RdR leader. He adds, however, that "there have often been situations in which it seemed that it was the end. Still, he always gained the upper hand. There is something in this man, a political instinct that makes this possible for him."

## Daily Views Personnel Changes in Belweder

*WS2908135394 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 27-28 Aug 94 p 2*

[Article by Kazimierz Groblewski: "Belweder's Reshuffles"]

[Text] We hear that Lech Walesa will soon issue an ordinance subordinating his chancellery to Mieczyslaw Wachowski, who is the head of his office. This may or may not happen. Today in the Belweder we are witnessing a clash of various groups and concepts, and it is not known which will prevail.

It looks as though we will see changes in the functioning of the Press Office. The office is the "brainchild" of Andrzej Drzycimski. His successor still has not been found.

It is no coincidence that the change in the position of the president's spokesman has been made right now. It may happen that no "clear-cut" person will agree to fill the post vacated by Andrzej Drzycimski. He or she will not want to work with Mieczyslaw Wachowski. In a few months' time, when Wachowski may no longer be there, someone with a "strong" character—for example, a person enjoying sympathy in rightist circles—might agree to replace Drzycimski.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

This is one of the interpretations of the ongoing personnel upheaval in the Belweder. In line with this interpretation, the recall of Drzycimski is part of the plan conceived by Mieczyslaw Wachowski and people devoted to him. In case the president wants to recall them, they want to prevent the establishment of a new, strong configuration. They hope that, even when they are recalled, they will retain their influence.

There is also a lot of other speculation concerning the present reshuffles in the Belweder.

The facts are as follows: The attempts to find a successor to Drzycimski are continuing. So far they have been futile. According to Andrzej Zakrzewski, who is now the "guardian" of the Press Office, the new spokesman is to be a professionally active journalist.

It is also a fact that Lech Walesa will have a better chance of winning the election if he regains the sympathy of rightist voters. Personnel changes in the Belweder may help him accomplish that—first of all the departure of the unpopular Minister Mieczyslaw Wachowski.

This does not have to happen now; it may occur in a few months' time. However, it is likely that it will happen.

There was unofficial talk in the Belweder that, for the period of the election campaign, Lech Walesa would want to have a "new face," which would be advertised by a more dynamic, "boxing" press spokesman than Andrzej Drzycimski. Drzycimski's departure was to be expected. However, it seemed that this change would be made early next year, when the election is really close.

Drzycimski's departure is said to have been precipitated by Wachowski, in line with the hypothesis described above—all the more so because conflicts between the two have been going on since last year.

It is possible that someone in the Belweder wants to already weaken Wachowski at this point and is making efforts to appoint some "clear-cut" person to the post of spokesman. Perhaps also for this reason, the attempts to find Drzycimski's successor have not been successful yet.

One cannot say for sure that Andrzej Drzycimski will not return to the Belweder. He will not be press spokesman, but he may retain the rank of secretary of state and assume a different post.

### Poll: Kwasniewski Heads List for President

*WS2908145994 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 29 Aug 94 p 1*

[Article by ZUK, NIKA: "In Line to the Palace"]

[Text] In line with the results of an opinion poll conducted by the Center for Research on Public Opinion [OBOP] for ZYCIE WARSZAWY, Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] Chairman Aleksander Kwasniewski stands the best chance of winning the presidential election. If they had been held this summer, Kwasniewski would have been backed in the first round by 28 percent of Poles.

Kwasniewski was followed by Waldemar Pawlak, Zbigniew Religa, Tadeusz Zielinski, Lech Walesa, and Leszek Balcerowicz. The Solidarity camp is still quite split. In line with OBOP data, Jacek Kuron and Tadeusz Mazowiecki would have obtained only 5 percent of the vote, the same number as Leszek Moczulski. Solidarity Chairman Marian Krzaklewski would have been supported by 3 percent of voters, former Prime Minister Jan Olszewski by 2 percent, and Supreme Court President Adam Strzembosz by 2 percent.

In the second round, Kwasniewski would have won. The data show that he would have had a considerable advantage over both Pawlak (53 percent of the vote compared to 37 percent, with 12 percent undecided) and Religa (52 percent compared to 36 percent). As recently as June, the chances of the peasant prime minister and the SLD leader in the second round seemed almost equal.

Kwasniewski is supported by almost 60 percent of people claiming leftist views, 40 percent of supporters of the center left, and 10 percent of the supporters of the right, 40 percent of people with anticlerical views, and 15 percent of people who declare confidence in the church and who expect that its influence will not be decreased.

There is an evident discrepancy between the succession of politicians in the preelection poll and their personal popularity. Kuron or Krzaklewski would have been supported by only 10 percent of their personal sympathizers. Walesa would have been backed by every third sympathizer. This is why on our list the president is in front of Kuron, even though he is less popular. Kwasniewski would have been supported by two-thirds of the people who profess a personal like for him.

GfK Polonia asked Poles in July what characteristics made Kwasniewski and Walesa good candidates for president, and which make them bad candidates.

As for the weak spots of the SLD leader, respondents most often listed his past: 9 percent of respondents called him "a communist" and recalled that he was a member of the United Polish Workers' Party and that he held high-level posts in the Polish People's Republic. He was praised for positive features of his character (34 percent), as well as for his intelligence, education, and knowledge of foreign languages (26 percent).

Among the factors that do not make Walesa a good candidate, the respondents most often (8 percent) listed incompetence, negative evaluation of his political accomplishments (5 percent), and the fact that he has not met the people's expectations (5 percent).

The OBOP poll for ZYCIE WARSZAWY was conducted between 15 and 19 July. There were 966 respondents over age 16.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

The GfK Polonia study was conducted this past July.

**Who would Poles support in the presidential election?**

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| A. Kwasniewski | 28 |
| W. Pawlak | 12 |
| Z. Religa | 12 |
| L. Walesa | 8 |
| T. Zielinski | 7 |
| L. Balcerowicz | 6 |
| J. Kuron | 5 |

## Lucchini-Warsaw Workers Vote for Wage Deal

*LD2908192494 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1700 GMT 29 Aug 94*

[Text] Sixty-seven percent of the Lucchini-Warsaw steelworks work force took part in the referendum on the new wage system, and 85 percent of them voted to accept the negotiated pay deal. However, the strike at the steelworks remains suspended until a schedule for the plant's modernization is worked out. Magdalena Winiarczyk talked to Jacek Gasiorowski, chairman of the strike committee:

[Begin recording] [Winiarczyk] What does this system guarantee for the workers?

[Gasiorowski] First, it guarantees that the level of pay we have had so far will be preserved. This is a general guarantee for everyone. It also guarantees higher pay, which will result from putting certain jobs into certain categories. The guaranteed pay increase in the lower pay brackets amounts to about 600,000 zlotys [Z], on average, and to about Z1 million in the higher pay brackets.

[Winiarczyk] A formal agreement will be signed tomorrow morning. What about the modernization of the steelworks for which you were fighting?

[Gasiorowski] This is an element that will block decisions by union strike committees on ending the strike altogether. I will be waiting for a response and replies from both important people in the Polish Government and the president. The president offered to help resolve the issue of land ownership that is blocking the modernization, so that a specific date can be set for the commencement of the modernization process in September or October at the latest. It is a very important matter for us because we cannot afford another delay of six or eight months. [end recording]

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

## Leaders 'Lied' About Minister's PUNR Ties

*AU2908181894 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 25 Aug 94 p 1*

[Ion Cristoiu editorial: "Petty Cheating at Top Level"]

[Text] Dumitru Tinu, chief editor of ADEVARUL, has noted a perfidious detail that escaped us, those concerned with uncovering the political and philosophical meanings of the recent government reshuffle. According to a statement made by Ioan Gavra [vice president of the Romanian National Unity Party-PUNR], Iosif Gavril Chiuzbaian, minister of justice, joined the government at the previous cabinet reshuffle as a PUNR member. Smelling something at the time, the press had cornered the new justice minister with all kinds of questions along these lines. But the minister, who swore with his hand on the Bible before God and Ion Iliescu that he will serve the truth and only the truth, also swore to the journalists that he had no political coloring. On the contrary, when he was told by the journalists, who knew something, that he belonged to the PUNR, he became quite upset. Not even a man with gonorrhea would have been more revolted than he was, as shown by his gestures. But here now comes Ioan Gavra to tell us—shrewdly winking like a caught con man—that Iosif Gavril Chiuzbaian was a PUNR member when he swore by all he held dear that he was not. What is more, that is also the reason Iosif Gavril Chiuzbaian joined the government, thus kicking out with his stout PUNR shoulders—after all, all PUNR members are stout, as they feed only from the whey of our national Ewe Lamb—one of the founding members of the Social Democratic Party of Romania [PDSR] and one of Ion Iliescu's most faithful followers, Petre Ninosu.

Ioan Gavra is a rather special figure on our political scene. Half clown and half idiot, he is the author of some of the queerest political statements from our sad post-December 1989 history. That is why his statements, which Ion Iliescu prudently and diplomatically labeled as being only exaggerated, are ignored by everybody. As far as our political life is concerned, they are as important as the casual and involuntary fart of a tourist in the vast open air of the mountains. However, this time his statement on Iosif Gavril Chiuzbaian's PUNR origin is most serious. Ioan Gavra's big mouth let loose a revolting truth. The justice minister resorted to petty cheating. In order to place his rear in a ministerial armchair, he lied without blinking. Iosif Gavril Chiuzbaian is not anybody. He is also an eminent lawyer and a very educated man. Without his political function today, Ioan Gavra would be an absolute zero. He would not even be hired by a market- stall keeper from Bucharest's outskirts to carry boxes with beer and Coca-Cola. That is why it is understandable that he is doing everything to stay, like a hen, on top of his garbage heap, which the experts call a political party. However, Iosif Gavril Chiuzbaian puzzles me. Did this post as minister in Vacaroiu's government—so much dependent on President Iliescu's whims—deserve such a serious disgrace? When he agreed to lie openly, did not the thousands of pages read until then revolt in his memory?

But let us say that Iosif Gavril Chiuzbaian had a moment of moral lapse. For a moment, the glitter of the governmental position made him lose the awareness of his own personality and made him stoop to the level of a mere pickpocket. If the affair had remained as such, at the level of a single man—even if that man was the minister of justice—the sham would have been somewhat acceptable. Unfortunately, it does not belong to Iosif Gavril Chiuzbaian alone. All those who plotted his appointment knew that the current minister of justice entered the government not as an independent, but as a PUNR member. Also in the know were: Ion Iliescu, who gave his presidential blessing and listened to his oath without blinking, although he was aware of the dissonance; Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu; and Adrian Nastase and Oliviu Gherman, heads of the PDSR, the party which negotiated with the PUNR the issue of the latter's backdoor entrance into the cabinet. All those allegedly honorable men did not breathe a word about the fact that Gavril Chiuzbaian joined the government as a PUNR member. Questioned by the press, they denied any rumors about a possible membership of the minister of justice in the Funar-Gavra party. They lied to us unashamedly. They lied to our faces. How can we now believe that they did not lie to us in the past on other matters, too, much more important for the country than this nice berth stealthily given to the PUNR?

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

## Final Results: Peace Plan Rejected in Referendum

*LD3008165594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1622 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Text] Pale, 30 Aug (TANJUG)—The maps of the territorial division of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina proposed by the international Contact Group were not accepted in the referendum held on 27-28 August in the Srpska republic, TANJUG was told today by Petko Cancar, president of the central referendum commission.

According to Cancar, complete and final results have arrived from the 82 municipalities of the Srpska republic. According to the reports, over 90 percent of voters were against the proposed division, with a negligible percentage of invalid votes and those voting in favor.

According to Cancar, a larger number of citizens than registered in the electoral lists voted at many of the 4,500 polling stations. However, he failed to specify the exact number of voters. The appearance of voters not registered in the electoral lists was explained by the fact that, following last year's referendum on the Vance-Owen plan, a considerable number of citizens born in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina had arrived in the Srpska republic from the territory of the former Yugoslavia and from areas under Muslim-Croat control.

The entire process of universal suffrage and the counting of the votes was monitored in many places by a number of foreign observers and reporters, Cancar said. He recalled that the final decision on the plebiscite, in accordance with the legal provisions on the referendum, will be made by the Srpska republic's people's assembly. The assembly session has been scheduled for 1 September, when the data on the referendum will become accessible to the public at large.

## Justice Minister Views Federation Structure

*AU3108103794 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 25 Aug 94 p 9*

[Interview with Justice Minister Mato Tadic by N. Idrizovic; place and date not given: "Disastrous Personnel Situation"]

[Text] *In order for the federation to function as planned by its Constitution, it is necessary to pass a series of laws and regulations to help enforce its basic law. The Ministry of Justice has been concentrating on preparing many bills to be included in a judicial procedure as soon as possible. What those bills are about and what they will regulate, we ask Justice Minister Mato Tadic.*

[Tadic] We are putting the finishing touches to the bill on federal units, cantons. A task force is in charge of that job and the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Physical Planning will carry it out. In addition to experts, the task force is composed of people who participated in negotiations in Vienna and Washington. These are Mr. Cukle and Mr. Markotic, representatives of the Administration for Geodesics, Property and Legal Relations. The draft text of the law is nearly completed and will be presented to political structures for analysis. Afterwards, it will follow regular procedures, first in the government and then in the Assembly. That is a crucial law and it would be difficult to implement the Washington agreement without it, as it is supposed to determine the number and then also the borders of cantons, both external and internal.

### Law on Cantons

[Idrizovic] How many cantons will there be, how will their borders be determined, and what is meant by external and internal borders?

[Tadic] The Vienna agreement envisages eight cantons. Preparations for this law are based on the Federation Constitution. Cantons will be formed on the basis of ethnic structure, i.e. Bosniac or Croat majority, and their external borders will be those toward the areas controlled by the Serbs, and they will be formed in keeping with the census conducted in 1991. Therefore, the starting point is the Federation Constitution, not a proposal of the contact group.

[Idrizovic] What legal obligations will those newly-formed units have?

[Tadic] First of all, right after the law is adopted, cantons must establish a cantonal assembly, which will consist of five deputies from the list of latest legal elections from every municipality. They will then adopt the cantonal constitution, a draft copy of which has already been distributed among deputies at the session held on 18 July, so that they could study it, although the constitution does not come within the province of any federal body, as is evident from the name—cantonal constitution.

[Idrizovic] The implementation of the Washington agreement largely also depends on the organization of municipalities. Is something being done to legally regulate that domain?

[Tadic] Of course. With the precise aim of implementing the Washington agreement, the Justice Ministry came up with a sample of a statutory decision to organize municipalities into municipality councils and issued instructions to accompany the decision. This material was also distributed to deputies so that people on the ground could get familiar with it as soon as possible.

[Idrizovic] How will municipalities be organized?

[Tadic] We are gathering information on effecting the transformation, which consists of former assemblies being transformed into assembly councils, as planned by the Federation Constitution, and there will also be a president of the council and head of municipality. We are working on the law for electing councillors to municipality councils and cantonal legislative bodies, as well as

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

to parliament's chamber of representatives. We are also working on rules for appointing members to the chamber of nations of the parliament, for they are not elected, but delegated.

[Idrizovic] What other laws will be passed on the federation level?

[Tadic] Bills on the Supreme Court, the Federal Prosecutor's Office, the insignia, coat of arms, and flag are topical for the time being. Furthermore, we are discussing bills on the organization of the judicial system, on military tribunals and the prosecutor's office.

**Delicate Situation Regarding Law on Amnesty**

[Idrizovic] What changes are planned with regard to military tribunals and the prosecutor's office?

[Tadic] The authority of military tribunals will be significantly limited and it will be precisely determined which activities and persons come within their province. Military tribunals will try those military persons and civilians working for the army who committed an act against the armed forces. Military tribunals will also try members of the civilian police when their function is subordinate to that of the army. Everything else will be settled in civilian courts. That is very important for the West, which does not know about military tribunals. They are allergic to the mere mention of them, as they associate them with something negative and like to see such institutions abolished.

[Idrizovic] Many fields have a personnel shortage. What is the situation in the justice department?

[Tadic] Disastrous. Many experts have left, some already at the beginning of the war, some went over to the other side, some went abroad, and many are leaving now, during the war, for the status of judges is impermissibly low. They are working as lawyers and earning much more money. That is only normal, for all over the world judges have the highest status and best salaries, for they are the guardians of the law, and the law is the foundation of the state. Therefore, I am deeply convinced that something will be done about that, otherwise we will face even greater disaster. Already now, some inexperienced people are trying very complicated cases. That is simply dangerous.

[Idrizovic] We often hear about the law or amnesty. How far did one get with its preparation?

[Tadic] The law on amnesty is in its draft version now. We took into consideration the opinions of other ministries as well, primarily those of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Defense Ministry, Foreign Ministry, and Ministry for Refugees. It will soon follow a regular procedure. We will organize meetings and discussions, for this law has political implications and is thus very delicate and its passing is conditional upon a series of previous activities, discussions, and decisions.

## Silajdzic Calls for End to Arms Embargo

*AU3108071794 Paris AFP in English 2104 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Text] Sarajevo, Aug 30 (AFP)—The Bosnian Government remains unambiguous about its demand for the arms embargo to be lifted, despite the risk of Serb action, Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic said Tuesday [30 August].

"If we continue to be underarmed and undersupplied there will be no balance of power and there will be no peace," he told AFP.

Silajdzic said the Bosnian Serbs' rejection of the international peace plan and the possibility of a partial lifting of the arms embargo in favour of Moslem-led forces, did not mean the Serbs were more likely to launch a preemptive attack.

"If they could, they would do it anyway," he said.

In Vienna, Madleine Albright, American Ambassador to the United Nations said Tuesday the deadline for the Bosnian Serbs to accept the international peace plan was October 15.

If they refused a resolution in the name of the United States to lift the arms embargo would be made to the Security Council, she said.

President Bill Clinton has said the Serbs' refusal to accept the peace plan would lead to arms being supplied to the Bosnian government forces by early winter.

On whether he believed Clinton would stick to his word, despite weakening international cohesion, Silajdzic said: "Absolutely. We take him very seriously. He is the president of the United States."

He said he was convinced the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and NATO would protect Bosnians against the Serbs before the embargo was lifted and added that Britain and France would be "accomplices in the project of a greater Serbia" if they withdrew from UNPROFOR if the arms embargo was lifted.

Britian and France have threatened to withdraw their peacekeepers if the arms embargo is lifted because of fears their troops may be taken as hostages and endangered by renewed fighting.

Siladjzic also said there was no question of renegotiating what had been decided by the international contact group—the United States, Russia, France, Britain and Germany—and totally rejected an eventual modification of the peace plan.

"The map question is solved and accepted by our government. The question is closed," he said.

The eventuality of a return to negotiations was alluded to on Monday by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

Kozyrev as an alternative to war, in a situation blocked by the Serbs refusal to accept the international peace plan.

### Bihac Official Guarantees Refugees Safe Return

*AU3008202694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Interview with Mirsad Veladzic, commissioner in the Government and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Mirza Sadikovic; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Sadikovic] Mr. Veladzic, what is your view on the current situation in the Bihac region, especially in the liberated area of Velika Kladusa?

[Veladzic] The situation in the Bihac region is today considerably more favorable than it was 10 or so days ago. It is very important to say that very favorable conditions have been created for the functioning of all state services, both civil and military, which are indeed providing security to the citizens of the Bihac region in these times of war.

Regarding the Velika Kladusa area, I can say that the situation there is also exceptionally favorable. The situation is only burdened by those expelled, people who had to leave their homes under the pressure of Fikret's rebels, who forced people to leave their homes. These people are now in an extremely difficult situation. They are in camps where many of them have been raped, tortured, and so forth. They have certainly not left this region of their own free will.

[Sadikovic] So life is returning to Velika Kladusa. Much has been done to make life better and more bearable. What can you say about this?

[Veladzic] One can say that the civilian authorities have done much. The war presidency is working nonstop. A Secretariat for National Defense has been set up, Velika Kladusa Radio has begun broadcasting, and local communes are being visited. The population has already started certain activities to normalize all the other services. The local water authorities have put the water system back into operation. The town has been cleaned up. There was also a ceremony, which local residents attended, to greet and see the troops from the 5th and the 6th Velika Kladusa Brigades presenting arms. It was very interesting and many people were overjoyed. Even those who have suffered psychological shocks see today that Fikret Abdic's propaganda has caused enormous damage. They are overjoyed to be able today to walk freely through the town and not to worry that they will be arrested and put in prison, as many people spent months in Fikret Abdic's prisons.

[Sadikovic] You and General Dudakovic [5th Corps commander] recently held talks with Sergio de Mello [head of UN Protection Force Civilian Sector] and U.S. Ambassador [to Croatia] Galbraith. What was concluded?

[Veladzic] We resolved to set up a returnee center in Velika Kladusa so as to create the conditions for people to realize that it is safe to return home. Second, guarantees were given that they will not be mobilized, not be inducted into the armed forces, which is a very important issue. Then, the international community, that is, its representatives will monitor the implementation of the amnesty. Next, the refugee, or rather the returnee, center will operate for six months. If some people do not want to return to their homes, they will be able to return to [UN Protected Area] Sector North. The possibility has already been envisaged for a [word indistinct] group to come here to (?check) and see what the situation in Velika Kladusa is like, so that certain policies could be based on this. In other words, to speed up activities here, solve this problem as soon as possible, and facilitate the return of people to their homes in normal conditions.

[Sadikovic] You are permanently here in Velika Kladusa and the surrounding area. Do you have a message for those who have been driven out to the UNPA?

[Veladzic] I would like to tell our citizens who are in a very difficult situation today to return to their Bosnia, to return to Velika Kladusa. We will certainly show a lot of understanding. We will try to lessen our joint suffering. We will forgive everything that can be forgiven. We believe that 90 and more percent of people are not guilty and that they have no reason whatsoever to fear. Those prosecuted will be tried according to the laws of Bosnia-Herzegovina. You know that this gives firm security; they will not be tried in the street, as was the case when Fikret Abdic ruled Velika Kladusa.

### Mortar, Grenade Explosions Increasing in Sarajevo

*AU3008183894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Report by Aida Krasnik]

[Excerpts] The [Serbian] enemy is continuing to attack the free parts of our country. The target of the aggressor's artillery and infantry today were Teocak, Zvornik, Gorazde, Tesanj, and Olovo. Mortar and grenade explosions are being increasingly frequently heard in Sarajevo. The humanitarian situation in Srebrenica has not improved at all. A UNHCR convoy today arrived with detergents and heaters. What an irony, with the residents of Srebrenica hungry and exhausted!

The free Teocak territory has been targeted by enemy artillery and infantry, with residential areas and defense lines hit by some 100 shells fired by a self-propelled gun and mortars. The result of this chetnik attack is one killed and several wounded civilians. In the free Zvornik territory, one person was seriously wounded. There is substantial material damage. [passage omitted]

The day on the Gorazde front was like all the other days. The aggressor continued to attack residential areas and defense lines. The Vranici area came under fierce fire

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

from enemy infantry, heavy machine guns, and antiaircraft guns. The Serbian-Montenegrin aggressors also attacked the separation lines using small arms and mortars, especially in the area of Drazalinci, Vranovina, and Borovac. The focus of the chetnik attacks on the Teslic-Doboj front was on the free parts of the Doboj Commune and the defense lines. [passage omitted]

In Sarajevo, enemy snipers were again active today, the Information Service of the 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina reports.

### Serbs Continue Attack on Cazin Region

*AU3008144794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic]

[Text] The artillery attacks, especially on Hasin Vrh and Alibegovica Kosa, that began last night have not stopped. The chetniks last night shelled the outskirts of Cazin, especially Strozarsko, which was hit by several howitzer projectiles. Material damage to civilian property is substantial.

The aggressor forces, men and hardware, have been noticed moving in the Bosanska Krupa area, the Grmusko-Srbljanski plateau, and toward Bihac. Martic's chetniks and Abdic's rebels have also been seen moving along the state border in the Velika Kladusa area. These forces have especially been moving around and digging in parts of [word indistinct] Bosanska Bojna, and Omovica.

Activities aimed at the normalization of life have continued in this region. Several shops have reopened. Primary and secondary schools are coming closer to the beginning of organized classes. A delegation of the expelled, (?accompanied) with international organizations, is supposed to finally come to Velika Kladusa today to see for itself what the situation in Velika Kladusa is like.

### Serbs Fire 'Guided Missiles' on Zavidovici Lines

*AU3108101794*

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0800 GMT on 31 August reports fighting in the following areas:

A reporter from the 7th Corps Press Center says that last night "the chetniks fired several artillery projectiles on Travnik. A general alarm was sounded on that occasion which continues to be in force at the time of reporting this." He also reports that "nearly all defense lines of our soldiers were targeted by the chetnik artillery last night." Reportedly, "the aggressor made the fiercest attacks on the positions of the 312th Hill Brigade." "The positions of the 207th Hill Brigade also came under attack by the chetnik artillery and 120-mm mortars." According to the reporter there were no casualties in these attacks while "all lines remained firm and stable." He also reports continued "ethnic cleansing of the temporarily occupied territory," and the announced "expulsion of another 200 Bosniak-Muslims to the Travnik free territory, which has been announced for today."

A report by the 3d Corps Press Center claims that "the chetniks" last night "carried out two powerful infantry-artillery attacks in the region of [word indistinct] and Visoka Glava. The attacks resumed early this morning." As the center continues to report, "on the Maglaj battlefield the chetniks attacked Mosevac, (?Kosova), and Bijela Ploca with all available arms, while the village of Imamovici in the Vozusa front suffered attacks from Bofors guns. In the evening all defense lines of Zavidovici were shelled from mortars while a few guided missiles were also fired at the lines of defense of the free Zavidovici territory. In the evening we noted a major regrouping of aggressor's troops on the Tesanj-Doboj battlefield as well as concentration of the aggressor's military hardware along all front lines."

Velid Dzindo reports from Olovo that beside infantry and antiaircraft weapons' fire, "the aggressor on Nisicki Plateau has been regrouping his forces and military hardware."

A statement by the 1st Corps Information Service reports sniper and infantry fire along the lines of separation in Sarajevo and "intensive movement of military vehicles" last night. Reportedly, "a convoy of some 20 military vehicles passed on Poljine-Vogosca route to be followed a little later by a convoy of 11 trucks and two tow-trucks in Mrkovici-Vogosca direction."

### 'Muslim Savagery' Reported on Krajina Front

*LD3008190894 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Text] The Muslims have been launching strong artillery and infantry attacks today against Serb fighters from the 2d Krajina Corps of the Bosnian Serb army. Slavisa Savic has the report.

[Savic] Positions held by members of the 2d Krajina Corps in Celar, Mrazovo, Zaloski Grabez, and Pritoka [near Bihac] were today exposed to infantry attacks by Izetbegovic's troops from the direction of Spahici, Zalozje, and Orljanska Kosa.

Muslim savagery is going on unabated in the western part of the Krajina front as well, more precisely near Krupa na Uni, which is particularly evident by the sniper activity.

Serb military sources reported today that prisoners from the former national defense of the autonomous province of western Bosnia are being deployed by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's 5th Corps along the very separation line—their punishment is to be sacrificed for the cause of Islamic fundamentalism.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

One Serb fighter was killed while another was seriously wounded in the fighting last night and today.

### 4th Corps Commander Criticizes HVO

*AU3008192194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Report by Borka Rudic]

[Excerpt] The officers and men of the 4th Corps of the Bosnia- Herzegovina Army are in complete control of the situation on the ground. The corps has fully integrated all the units of this military formation and a sound basis has been created for the struggle against the aggressor and the further liberation of the occupied territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was stated, among other things, by Brigadier General Ramiz Drekovic at a news conference today. The conference was held in Jablanica. General Drekovic was accompanied by other members of the 4th Corps Command. Borka Rudic has the details:

[Rudic] The Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor on the territory of the Konjic Commune is regrouping his forces and infiltrating subversive groups into the territory under the control of the 4th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. This was stated by Brigadier General Ramiz Drekovic, speaking about the current military situation. He stressed that all attempts to compromise the defense lines have successfully been thwarted.

Regarding the implementation of the Petkovic-Delic [HVO-Bosnia-Herzegovina Army commanders] military agreement, General Drekovic stressed that an analysis is currently being prepared on what has been achieved so far, that is, what has not been done, and that this analysis will be presented to the Joint Committee of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] in Gornji Vakuf, as well as to the commands of these two military formations.

In this context, in reply to a journalist's question at today's news conference, General Drekovic stressed that he has not recently been in contact with the representatives of the HVO, who, as he said, have not withdrawn their units, as they should have by 15 August, as planned. Since they have not withdrawn their units, we have not done so either.

The fighters and officers of the 4th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will implement all the orders of their command, and will do their utmost to implement what has been agreed and signed, General Drekovic said.

Journalists at the news conference held in Jablanica today were also addressed by Messrs. Saban Sviljak, commander of the recruiting-training center of the 4th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, Dzemal Rahimic, deputy commander of the 42d Brigade, and Sarif Stago, commander of 49th brigade. [passage omitted]

### Commentary on Importance of Abdic's Defeat

*AU3008173994 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 25 Aug 94 p 1*

[Commentary by Mehmed Halilovic: "Dismantling Ministates"]

[Text] The entry of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army into Velika Kladusa could have more symbolic and actual importance for the future of this country than the final dismantling of Abdic's para-state in northwest Bosnia on Sunday, 21 August. However, even if there were no other significance, the mere liberation of a great part of the territory and disposal of the greatest nightmare tormenting the Bosniaks caused by a betrayal of tragic consequences would be enough to provide great pleasure and enormous encouragement.

With just a grain of "journalistic license," we could call it a great, if not the greatest, victory for the Bosnian Army (the 5th Corps was simultaneously fighting against Serb forces from Bosnia and occupied parts of Croatia) and Bosnian policies. It is a victory for Bosnia that heralds more victories to come.

The self-styled "autonomous province of western Bosnia," which has survived for barely 11 months, was the last of three ministates to be formed during the war on the territory of Bosnia and the first to disappear from the military and political scene. Indeed, it was the smallest of the three, and the weakest militarily, but probably the most lethal one on the political and national scene, for its task was to break Bosnia from within, to complete the job begun by the external aggression. Therefore, its defeat is incalculable. But there is no doubt that this could be the beginning of the end for the remaining two para-states, the so-called Srpska republic and the Croatian republic of "Herceg-Bosna," which have also been badly shaken. Already in March, by signing the alliance with Sarajevo, Zagreb put an expiry date on "Herceg-Bosna," while Belgrade is publicly turning its back on its Pale child, created with bayonets and mass murder.

Both renunciations were extracted under coercion from the international community, and that is why we cannot fully stop doubting the real intentions of their true masters, but the experience with Abdic could again prove helpful. He, too, first lost political and then military support and was also pressured from abroad, but nevertheless he remained in power until he suffered a full military defeat. Therefore, the main message is that a political turnaround in Zagreb or Belgrade does not automatically mean the end of those para-states, as long as they are backed up by respectable military forces, both their own and those of neighboring countries. The force must either be neutralized, which can be done in several ways, or defeated.

Bosnian politics and the Bosnian Army have displayed a readiness to face both alternatives. The forming of the federation is the first and military success the second

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

alternative. Whether the ensuing events happen according to the first or the second option does not depend solely on us.

### Tuzla-Podrinje SDA Committee Views Opposition

*AU2608210094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 26 Aug 94*

[Text] The Cantonal Committee of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] of Tuzla-Podrinje Canton has issued a public statement. Here is Salih Brkic with highlights from it:

[Begin Brkic recording] The United Opposition of Tuzla-Podrinje Canton did not and could not have any part in creating and realizing the concept of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in these regions. This role belongs, above all, to the cantonal committees of the Party of Democratic Action and the Croatian Democratic Community who are politically and [word indistinct] most responsible for the implementation of the Washington Agreement. Other parties possess some role in the political (?creation) and in legislative and executive power, but only so much as they won in the free multiparty elections, the public statement by the Cantonal Committee of the Party of Democratic Action of Tuzla-Podrinje Canton says.

The ruling parties of Tuzla Commune are well aware of this fact regarding the execution of power in the bodies, institutions, and enterprises in Tuzla Commune. We shall give as an example the fact that the Tuzla communal bodies do not include a single representative of the Party of Democratic Action of Tuzla.

All citizens of Tuzla and Tuzla-Podrinje Canton know that a public debate on the proposal of the constitutional law of the canton was held in the Hotel Tuzla on 19 August and that all [words indistinct] of the United Opposition took part in it, which fortunately can be confirmed by television and newspaper reports, it is said in the statement by the cantonal committee of the Party of Democratic Action. The preparations for the constitutive session of the Cantonal Assembly was a similar situation, including cadre issues.

This is why the statement of the United Opposition of Tuzla-Podrinje Canton is strange and full of fabrications and insinuations. Their aim, however, is clear: The blocking and hampering of the factual realization of the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the struggle for power, and, above all, the besmirching of our Cantonal Committee, the public statement of the Cantonal Committee of the Party of Democratic Action of Tuzla-Podrinje Canton says. [end recording]

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

## Government Resists Pressure To Accept Refugees

*LD3008173694 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Text] Despite strong pressure by international circles—in particular by the UNHCR—to allow some 10,000 refugees from western Bosnia to cross into the free territory of Croatia, the Croatian Government's response is still negative.

This was confirmed by a radio statement by Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Kostovic this afternoon. He said Croatia did not have the means to look after such a large number of refugees and recalled that their safe return to their homes was now guaranteed by the international community.

Today's reports confirm that the refugees do not want to return to western Bosnia.

## IDS Official Views HDZ Control Over Istria

*AU2708163694 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 19 Aug 94 p 5*

[Report by D. Sisovic on IDS press conference in Pazin on 18 August: "The HDZ Is Destroying the Croatian Identity of Istria By Exercising Totalitarian Control"]

[Text] "Istria is still treated as a political issue and an emergency area that requires special advisers," Damir Kajin, deputy president of the IDS [Istrian Democratic Party], stated at yesterday's news conference in Pazin. The conference was largely dedicated to the secret document, published in the last issue of FERAL TRIBUNE, on the founding of the Department for Media Planning at the office of the president of the republic that is in charge of the media agency for state policies. This secret document, the adoption of which has not been confirmed although there is no doubt that it was proposed, again honors Istria with what other counties do not have—there is a special chapter planning the media strategy toward Istria, said Kajin, commenting on individual provisions and connecting them with the "visible" political actions. The HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] strategy toward Istria comprises financial control, information control, and physical force, Kajin said, and added that financial control was carried out by controlling large banking and tourist systems and thorough the personnel structuring of management boards, from which not even elementary schools have been exempted. He also said that, at that level, the control has been successful, but, for instance, the control over the Italian retirement pensions has not been established, which is why the HDZ leaders are so sensitive about the issue when they discuss it.

IDS Secretary Emil Soldatic said that information control, expressed in the above-mentioned document by the motto "information does not serve to inform, but it serves the war," is part of the process of militarizing Croatian society, through which the HDZ, having fulfilled its historical task of a political movement and having used up its legitimacy, is trying to hang onto power. Remarking that GLAS ISTRE, NOVI LIST, and LA VOCE DEL POPOLO managed to avoid the state media control through timely transformation, Damir Kajin gave Radio Pazin as an example of media control—there is not a minute of the program dedicated to interviews with county politicians, while hours are spent on attacking them.

### Coexistence Against Force

Kajin continued to say that Istria knew the elements of physical force from the maxim: "The army and the police should be used in dealing with Istria," and, posing the question of how such plans can be opposed with no money, no media, and the material goods usurped, while one is not inclined toward force, he answered that Istria could do so only with its traditional spirit of tolerance, coexistence, and civic homogenization. Only this Istrian position can guarantee the survival of the recognizable Istrian identity, Kajin concluded, adding that the methods used by the supporters of the "hard" approach to Istria lead to the disintegration of the Croatian identity of Istria.

Continuing the discussion of the HDZ plan for establishing media control, Emil Soldatic remarked that in democratic societies information is an important element in creating a democratic public, which is a medium between the political power and the electoral body. However, what the HDZ wants in Croatia is very different from the European idea of democracy.

The IDS leaders also spoke about the recent founding of the Miroslav Bulesic Foundation for the restoration of a Pauline monastery at Sveti Petar u Sumi. The idea of establishing the foundation is a good one, and if its purpose is to revitalize the monastery, then it should be welcomed, but the supporters of the idea have compromised everything they embarked upon, Damir Kajin said, emphasizing that "the presence of high-ranking HDZ officials in this foundation, which avoids the public and the press, leaves the impression that the purpose of the foundation is not what it purports to be, but a political one." Emil Soldatic brought up the question of why the restoration of the monastery was not entrusted to the institutions normally involved in restoration and why the Ministry of Culture has not found the time and the funds for the restoration of the Supetar monastery, and then went on to answer, saying that the reason was that "the party, that is, the HDZ, needs such projects to create parallel power centers that are, in essence, undemocratic."

## HDZ, SDA Officials Meet in Zagreb

*LD3008141094 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Excerpt] The presidium of the Croat Democratic Union [HDZ] of Bosnia-Herzegovina met in Mostar today to

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

discuss the recent meeting of senior officials of the HDZ and the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and the continuation of the interparty talks. Zdenko Vranjes reports:

[Vranjes] The next round of talks between HDZ and SDA leaders is scheduled for 5 September in Kresevo.

We were dissatisfied with the fact that SDA Chairman Alija Izetbegovic did not attend the last meeting of the most senior officials of the two parties in Hrasnica. We hope that he will take part in the next meeting, because the attendance of an SDA delegation at the highest level would show that this party is interested in the implementation of the HDZ initiative to remove all obstacles to the speedy implementation of the Washington agreement through interparty talks, it was said at today's session.

The agreement in principle that HDZ and SDA representatives hold joint preparations for the constituent assembly session, and that the agreement that systemic laws—which will make possible the establishment of municipalities and grand counties [velezupe] in line with the federal constitution—is passed by the end of September were today described as the most important achievements of the recent interparty meeting. [passage omitted]

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

## FRY Citizen Killed in Border Struggle

*LD3008173094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1641 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Text] Skolje, 30 Aug (TANJUG)—A member of a police patrol of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] has killed a citizen of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] near the village of Tabanovci near Kumanovo on the border with the FRY. He was killed in the vicinity of the road and railway border crossing there as he was illegally crossing the border.

This was announced today by the Ministry for Internal Affairs of Macedonia.

Its statement says that the police patrol intercepted three citizens of neighboring Yugoslavia about 100 meters within the state territory. They illegally crossed the border, carrying goods which they intended to resell.

When ordered to stop, the group started running back toward FRY territory. The policemen in the patrol caught up with them and, in the course of the ensuing struggle, the automatic gun of one of the policemen fired a bullet into the chest of one of the FRY citizens. He succumbed to his wounds on his way to Kumanovo.

The other two persons from FRY have been remanded at the office of the Ministry for Internal Affairs in Kumanovo. They will face charges for crossing the border illegally at the magistrate's court.

The slain citizen of the FRY was the third person killed this summer in the border area between the FRY and Macedonia while crossing the border with smuggled goods.

Thanks to this kind of use of firearms on the part of Macedonian border patrols, the northern border of Macedonia is likely to win a reputation as the bloodiest border in Europe.

## Preelection Maneuvering by Parties, Personalities

*94BA0396A Skopje VECER in Macedonian 13-14 Aug 94 p 3*

[Article by Manco Mitevski: "The Parties Are Selecting Their Teams"]

[Text] Like it or not, according to the old or the new law, sooner or later elections will be held within the stipulated period between November and the end of the year. This can no longer be avoided by anyone. The fact that this has finally been realized by the parliamentary and all other parties is already becoming clear, based on the information that the party leaderships, although officially in recess, have increased their preelectoral activities and have initiated their "joint training sessions." Meanwhile, despite the fact that the representatives and the parliamentary leadership are in recess, a parliamentary session has been scheduled at which the parliamentary political opponents must once again cross lances and make yet another effort to participate in the elections, for without this it would be impossible for them to appoint members to the Republic and township electoral commissions and candidates for the numerous election lists. Bearing in mind that it is a question of very sensitive electoral instruments, which all parties would like to influence, this opens an area for new quarrels, haggling, obstructions, and foot-dragging. Luckily, this will end, albeit with quarrels and, most likely, with a compromise among parliamentary parties. This will open the way to the elections....

Based on the fact that, slightly over a month ago, a united opposition was announced, at that point for the single purpose: a vote of (no) confidence in the current government (this unity was mainly between the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] and Gosev's DP [Democratic Party]), we know that this union may acquire a broader use. Recently, statements were made and subsequently denied, but according to which, one of the partners in the united opposition, the Democratic Party, has already initiated a preliminary discussion about an eventual coalition tie in the next elections with the biggest opposition party—the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE (however, the possibility of a coalition has not been denied). Based on the correlation of forces within the parties now in opposition, and on the basis of what one may surmise, if it is a question of an eventual coalition, the contact point could be located somewhere along the link between the center and the right wing (the DP is proclaiming itself a centrist party, with a strong leaning to the right, while the VMRO-DPMNE is advancing mainly to the right). If matters come to a coalition, one could immediately identify the representative team—the Gosev-Georgievski pair—in which it would be realistic to expect that Gosev will promote his candidacy for president of the state, and Georgievski, for assembly chairman. Within this centrist-rightist pole, some forces would like and have even tried to include Vasil Tupurkovski. However, at the present time this is not certain in the least, especially since the leaders (Gosev and Georgievski) cannot be essentially inspired by the presence among them of such a personality in the highest leadership positions, particularly those from the DP (Marjanovic, Tortevski, or Tupevski who, in general, cannot "tolerate it"). Nor does Tupurkovski himself favor it; unless some particular interest motivates him which is hardly likely at the present time. Furthermore, if the leaderships of those two parties are giving initial thoughts to a coalition, resistance within the broad party circles will be high and they will insist on each party trying its luck alone. It may be expected that at the last moment, as in many other cases in the past, whenever some kind of unification became necessary, Gosev and Georgievski put an end to their "flirtation."

Similar thoughts exist on the other political pole on Macedonia's [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] political map, with the only difference

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

that some of its choices of gentlemen's agreements were selected in the past elections, and at the by-election in the Skopje 103d district they successfully benefited in an electoral coalition as demonstrated by the very fact that their candidate won and became a representative. It should be expected that the parties within the governmental coalition, but minus the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] may decide to participate jointly in the second parliamentary elections. Judging by what the political circles close to that coalition are saying, although agreements are as yet to be reached, the electoral coalition is quite well-known. Still, the conditions, reciprocal concessions, and rules of the game have yet to be determined. According to DEMOKRATIJA, the newspaper of the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia], in seeking its specific identity, this party is shifting away from the left and gravitating toward the center. It is precisely there that there is talk of a "democratic center" with defined and coordinated guidelines and principles. The team which will represent this center, the "Gligorov-Crvenkovski pair" is being mentioned. The LP [Liberal Party] and the SP [Socialist Party] will be included in the "democratic center," and the pair will include Stojan Andov, the leader of the LP.

Therefore, although it may seem that summer lethargy prevails on the Macedonian political scene, the parties are actively working, intensifying the training of their teams on all levels, which is quite normal for parties with ambitions to power leadership positions.

Although the summer monotony has not triggered any political attention among the public, it was briefly disturbed, as though by a quiet wind, by the World Macedonian Congress, in its Todor Petrov version. Although it was proclaimed as above-party, this association—bearing in mind the personalities of which it is composed and the political orientation they support—dealt most extensively with politics. It created, criticized, submitted motions, and threatened. There is nothing controversial in this. What is controversial is that at its congress session that association did not contribute in any way to a rapprochement among Macedonians but, with its immoderate discussion, it intensified divisions among them. The negative balance of the congress should include the problems facing the Macedonian authorities (which will benefit the Greeks) from the statements made from its rostrum concerning Salonika as the main city, Mount Olympus and Mount Pirin, the tanks, and so forth....

## Companies Violating Standards, Sanctions

*94BA0365C Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 19 Jul 94 p 2*

[Article by S. Kiridzievska: "Abusing the Consumers' Trust"]

[Text] *Attracted by the low prices of some domestic and imported products, consumers have been confronted by the problem of poor quality; in the first five months, over 1,000 metric tons of detergent of suspect quality were imported; these are products made outside of the traditional technological process, by simply mixing the dry components, without enough active ingredients.*

In the new situation of a free market and an increased supply of domestic and foreign products, it frequently happens that products are offered on the domestic market that do not meet prescribed quality standards. The consequences of this affect the final consumer of those products (food products, detergents, cleaning supplies, cosmetics, textile products, pesticides). Recently there have been increasingly more vocal objections by domestic producers that oversight over what is being imported is being neglected, and so consumers' trust is being abused in the market, and this is in the name of some sort of competition. The declaration on the mass liberalization of imports seems to have lost its basic point, and thus, exploiting the loose control of imports, mostly products of suspect quality are being imported. Consequently, there have been increasingly more emphatic arguments in favor of protecting domestic production in the way that it is done in the West.

At almost every step through Slovenia, it seems that one encounters signs saying, "Buy domestic products from our factories; that will save jobs for your children." "When you read this, it becomes clear to you why, whenever we try to import our products," says Avram Kiprovski, commercial director at the OHIS AD [Skopje Organic Chemicals Industry Enterprise, Inc.], "they answer us by saying, 'We have it.'" Albania, even though it has minimal production of detergents, has introduced 45 percent higher duties on imports of those products. The same duty is also levied in Turkey for imports of polyacrylic fibers. In our country several products are imported freely, and thus consumers, attracted by the low price of some of the imported and domestic products, have been confronted by the problem of poor quality.

This is the direct reason why an OHIS research team performed a complete analysis of these phenomena in the area of detergents and auxiliary cleaning supplies, pesticides, and PVA [expansion not given] products. According to the data, during the first five months of this year, over 1,000 tons of these products were imported. These are the Oskar, Miksal, Dzoli, Moj, Faks, Veron, and ABC detergents, and detergents originating from Russia, Turkey, and Bulgaria. The importers are the Tikves AK [Agricultural Combine], Makpetrol, Uniprokom, Unikompani, Vardar-Komerc, Prvi Partizan, EVT [expansion not given], Sileks, PKB [expansion not given], and others. In recent months, the EVT and Medija Komerc enterprises imported over 400 tons of hygienic supplies from Italy. "Comparative studies in our laboratories and research," says Vojce Karaifilovski, assistant general director of OHIS, "have indicated the unsuitable quality of the Dzoli, Adrija, ABC, Faks, and Miksal products. These," he said, "are products that are not manufactured by the traditional technological process, but rather by the drying mixing of incomplete

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

components. In their chemical composition, the basic active ingredients constitute much smaller percentages than those prescribed by the quality standards."

"What has been happening recently," Karaifilovski said, "is that newly formed private enterprises package their products, primarily liquid detergents, in OHIS packages. That has been also observed with the Moj product from Urko-Kamnik, which was packed in Lira packages. We are not afraid of competition from detergents with world names, such as Cersil, Ariel, and Vizir, which are of proven quality and motivate the domestic production."

Such machinations have also been observed more and more often with respect to imports of pesticides. They are of unknown origin, with reduced contents of active ingredients, which automatically earns them the label "counterfeit." The case of Rubigan from Serbia and BI 58 from Bulgaria are well-known. A very unique type of abuse has occurred in the case of the Agro Nova enterprise in Skopje, which represents the products of the Israeli company Makateshim-Agan. This enterprise sells products with the names of counterparts from the Ciba Gajgi and Dipon producers, even using labels with the original names. From this firm, Agrocentar in Kocani also imports several products from Bulgaria for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, together with 10,000 liters of OHIS's Karate product. It is doing this even though according to the legal regulations in the pesticide area, only the bearer of the product's registration has import and export rights in FYROM [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. The Ministry of Agriculture thinks that all producers of pesticides that are registered in our country should be represented. That will increase competition and prices will go down. What is being imported illegally into FYROM during the transit of these products is not being monitored, however.

OHIS emphasizes that it is not opposed to competition, but it is against imports that cause the dismissal of our workers. That is precisely why its proposal for the active involvement of the Consumers' Council at the Chamber of Commerce of FYROM, as well as for increased monitoring of the quality of both imports and domestic production, and for the involvement of inspectorate services and judicial bodies, should be viewed primarily as being in support of fair competition and the protection of consumers.

## Domestic Prices Affected by Exports to Serbia

*94BA0365B Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 18 Jun 94 p 3*

[Article by K. Janisliev: "Reduced Supply and Exports Have Raised Prices"]

[Text] *Cutting production in half and marketing in Serbia, where they are even sold at 3 German marks [DM] apiece, have raised the purchase price of tomatoes.*

Gevgelija, Jun—Tomatoes either fall down in the fields or sell like hotcakes. This year the latter part of this traditional characteristic of the marketing of this vegetable is happening in Gevgelija. In a period during which record purchases have been completely ordinary in this area, there are almost no tomatoes. In the Bogdanci-Stojakovo-Bogorodica region, which is traditionally the main producer of early vegetables, the harvest under plastic sheets has ended, along with half of the production from open fields. The purchase price has "jumped" to 32 denars, and some merchants are even offering 35. A few days ago, at the wholesale market in Skopje, tomatoes were being sold at retail for DM1.80 per kilogram, while in Serbia, they even reached the price of DM3! Why have tomatoes become so expensive?

The answer is very simple: Because in spite of all the changes, the situation in the production and marketing of early vegetables has remained unchanged. Because of the bad experiences last year and the failure in production, the farmers of Gevgelija, with no other choice, cut the area planted with vegetables in half. They did this on their own. They only planted 450 hectares with tomatoes, of which 250 hectares are under plastic sheets, and tomatoes have been dominant every year. Last year, of 750 hectares planted with tomatoes, as many as 500 were covered with plastic sheets. The expensive raw materials influenced the change in the structure of production, but also the uncertain marketing.

Before the beginning of the harvest, the farmers were even worried about marketing the reduced crop, since no one was buying tomatoes in an organized manner. It is only sporadically that merchants come and buy tomatoes just gathered from the fields. Nevertheless, probably the few producers could not have satisfied the demand, and there is also no doubt that even the reduced production this year will cover last year's losses. Thanks to the penetration of the Serbian market, not only are there no problems in sales, but the price is also increasing substantially because of the scarcer supply.

From 20 to 30 trucks of tomatoes are delivered to Serbia daily, which is significantly reducing the load on the domestic market. When merchants find this kind of safety valve, then of course they raise the price, trying to earn as much as possible. Consequently, in the FYROM [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] market, not only the Skopje market but also the German one, the retail price of tomatoes has jumped to 80 denars a kilogram. Since the regulator of this kind of price is the price achieved in sales in Serbia, where tomatoes are sold for DM3, as in the past the bill for the chaos in the market will be paid by the consumers and producers, although the latter are in a more favorable position this time. In contrast to the merchants who have skimmed the cream, however, the consumers are still being harmed.

Will the price of tomatoes grow even more, and will it go beyond the winter price? Experts on the marketing of

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

vegetables in Gevgelija think that it should not happen. As confirmation of this, they cite the wholesale market, which is the main barometer of market conditions, where, after the unusual jump in the wholesale price to DM1.80, it stabilized at DM1:20—even though the harvesting of tomatoes in Gevgelija is being reduced, and the crop has not yet been gathered in some areas, for example, Davidovo-Miletkovo, where this year, for the first time, larger areas were planted with tomatoes, as well as the fact that the export quota for Serbia has been extended. Sales are continuing without interruption, and the price of tomatoes will continue to remain the same up until the moment that the market's safety valve is shut off. In that case, if there are tomatoes that are left unharvested, perhaps they will become cheaper.

## Smuggling of Meat on Serbian Border

*94BA0365A Skopje VECER in Macedonian 19 Jul 94 p 10*

[Article by B. D. Konstantinov: "Fatty Steak"]

[Text] Jadran Komerc from Kavadarci and the firm's manager Stefan Mancev, likewise from Kavadarci, have been declared by the Skopje Customs House's Commission for Customs Violations to be guilty and have been sentenced to extremely high fines. Jadran Komerc, as a legal person, has been fined 150,000 denars, and Mancev has been fined 23,000 denars. Nevertheless, the secondary codefendants, Eksport-Import from Skopje and manager Jurica Prizmic, were given extremely high fines by the Commission. The Eksport-Import public enterprise was fined 400,000 denars, and manager Prizmic was fined 28,000 denars.

### Boneless

These high fines were levied because Jadran Komerc of Kavadarci, as an authorized shipper and its manager Stefan Mancev (who acted in the name of and on behalf of the responsible legal person), when crossing the border at Tabanovce on 12 July, on behalf of Eksport-Import from Skopje, declared imports of frozen peas in the amount of 21,000 kilograms gross weight.

Jadran Komerc and Mancev declared the frozen peas on ECD [Uniform Customs Declaration] No. 15647, and at the same time requested reloading into a refrigerated truck for import customs clearance at Kavadarci. The customs officers at the border crossing decided to make a complete inspection of the refrigerated truck with license plate TV 108 JZ/888 JF. Upon inspection, the customs officers discovered that only the first row in the rear of the truck was loaded with frozen peas, probably as "camouflage" in order to conceal other goods.

In the interior of the refrigerated truck, the customs officers discovered meat. There were 5,210 kilograms gross weight of frozen peas, and not 21,000, as declared on the ECD. On the other hand, 3,000 kilograms of beef, 8,015 kilograms of boneless lamb, 1,998 kilograms of pork rump roast, and 4,026 kilograms of pork loin were discovered inside. All these quantities were gross weight. The beef and lamb were not declared as imports, while pork, by a special decision of the government of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], has been banned as an import from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY].

### Accomplices

The secondary defendants, the Eksport-Import public enterprise in Skopje as the importer, and its manager Jurica Prizmic of Dubrovnik, temporarily residing in Skopje, were found guilty and fined because they assisted the first defendants, as the shippers, in not declaring all the goods loaded into the refrigerated truck.

Defendant Prizmic, at the Biserturs shipping company in Kumanovo, on the basis of the bill of lading, filled out the ECD only for the frozen peas, although Eksport-Import and its manager knew that substantial quantities of meat were inside the refrigerated truck. They did this in order to evade the clause banning imports of meat from the FRY, as well as to avoid declaring the meat for import duties in general. According to an estimate by experts from the Skopje Customs House, the above-mentioned meat found in the refrigerated truck, in this specific case, is worth over 109,000 German marks.

The Commission, in settling the case of the smuggled meat, in addition to the high monetary fines, decided on 15 July in the first instance to confiscate the meat involved in the customs violation. Until a final decision by the appeals commission at the FYROM Customs Administration, the meat has been placed in a refrigerator under customs supervision.

## Newspaper Readership Figures Examined

*94P21126A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 13 Aug 94 p 16*

[Unattributed report: "How Many Readers Are There in Macedonia?"]

[Text] The figures on readership of the daily press in the European countries should concern us if we want to be considered part of Europe. The facts, however, reveal something quite different and very striking.

Thus, for a population of 2.2 million, 35,000 copies of the dailies (NOVA MAKEDONIJA, VECER, FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT, which recently became a daily, and a few publications from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) are sold in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], that is, only 16 newspapers per 1,000 inhabitants. This figure is far, far below the European average of 220 copies and that of the less-developed countries of the European Union, for example Portugal, where 38 papers are sold per 1,000 inhabitants, or Greece with 83 newspapers per thousand, and cannot compare with the readership in Great Britain, where the same number of inhabitants buy not

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

just 16 dailies, but 361—about twenty times our number! There is also nothing favorable about the financial situation of our press; about 35 percent of its income depends on advertising. This puts us at the bottom of the European list.

### Former Party Official Investigated in Murder

*94BA0386A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 5 Aug 94 pp 1-2*

[Article by D.R.: "Political Assassination or Mafia Quarrel?"]

[Text] *Ljubo Jovanovski, former member of the Macedonian Liberation Committee, the DOOM [Movement for the Liberation and Unification of Macedonia] and of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] and former chief controller of the VMRO-DPMNE Committee Abroad, and one of the main characters in the Sina Ptica [Blue Bird] affair, told the Belgian police that he was attacked for political reasons.*

Was it unsettled accounts, an attempt at robbery, or a political conflict? After the murder on Sunday evening in the home of Ljubo Jovanovski, in the district known as Texas, in the small Belgian city of Clabecq, for the time being there is no answer. The event has triggered the interest of the Belgian police and the investigation is still being pursued. What initially seemed an act of self-defense, in which the person who tried to disturb the peace in a house lost his life, has developed into a real affair that has triggered the interest of the Belgian police and has been the subject of extensive attention on the part of the Belgian press and the Macedonian community.

What concerns the Belgian authorities is an eventual political dimension of the event. Ljubo Jovanovski himself stated to the police that the reasons which led the two Macedonians to enter his house were political. According to what he said to the investigative judge, last year one of his friends was killed in Brussels. Furthermore, Jovanovski claimed that his name is on the list of individuals scheduled for elimination. Did anyone indeed send Dimitrov and Cvetkovski to liquidate him? Is this somehow related to the newly formed Macedonian National Front Party, whose originator and member is Ljubo Jovanovski and who is known to our public from the "Sina Ptica" affair and the establishment of the so-called Macedonian National Guard? Or could it be a question of criminal actions and a robbery, which Dimitrov and Cvetkovski carried out in Jovanovski's house, which makes the police suspicious, for according to the Belgian daily SOIR, precision scales and jeweler's tweezers and currency from several countries were found in Jovanovski's home? Was this a political or a criminal act? All of these questions were also asked by Nivelle District Investigative Magistrate Lucque Mas. For the time being, he refuses to reveal greater details from his investigation, in the course of which he may ask for the help of the Macedonian police concerning Jovanovski's political standing and activities.

We obtained details concerning this event from the public prosecutor of the district in which the murder took place. They are different from the initial and partial data we obtained shortly after the occurrence. Blazenko Cvetkovski, also known as Boban Tenevic, forced his way into the home of Ljubo Jovanovski, who has been living in Belgium for more than 20 years, spat in the face of Jovanovski's wife, and demanded that she call her husband. She tried to object, claiming that he was resting. However, the violator paid no attention and started climbing the stairs. Then Ljubo Jovanovski appeared with a gun in hand. The quarrel between them became heated and Jovanovski's wife at that moment ran out of the house together with their 11-year old son. The police have not disclosed the precise development of the event but we know that Cvetkovski fired, for two bullets from his pistol were found in the wall of the house. Jovanovski fired back. He first fired a rubber bullet. The second was a real 12-caliber bullet, and proved fatal to Cvetkovski. Jovanovski told the police that he did not want to kill him and that he fired in self-defense, aiming at Cvetkovski's feet. However, he hit him in the stomach and Cvetkovski died on the way to the hospital.

Ljubo Jovanovski realized the seriousness of the situation and, afraid, tried to run away through the backyard. However, Cvetkovski was not alone, and his associate Robert Dimitrov, also known as Rajko Tomic (both Cvetkovski and Dimitrov had double identities and, while hiding from the police, gave fictitious names and operated under two different names) chose this moment to enter the house where he found the body of his friend. Probably afraid, he decided to run away but not before attempting at least a small revenge by breaking the windshield of Jovanovski's car. The police are still looking for Robert Dimitrov who is on the run.

The initial investigation revealed that neither Cvetkovski nor Dimitrov were unknown to Jovanovski and his wife, and even that for a while they lived not far from them, most likely after their arrival in Belgium. They borrowed money from the family, with which they managed to buy a car, and it appears that their attack on Jovanovski's home was based on the same reasons. However, they were unable to collect any money. Ljubo Jovanovski voluntarily surrendered to the police, who released him after an interrogation, the investivation magistrate being satisfied that that the shooting was in self-defense. For the time being, the Belgian police have not allowed for the body of Cvetkovski to be shipped to Macedonia because of the investigation.

Otherwise, Dimitrov and Cvetkovski are known to the Belgian police for having committed thefts and for misrepresentation. Last July, they were sentenced to two years in jail each. However, they were amnestied on 14

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

July. Ljubo Jovanovski had no previous police record and, claiming self-defense, was released.

**[Box, p 2]**

**Who Is Ljubo Jovanovski?**

Ljubo Jovanovski from Brussels is a former emigrant to Belgium. He is a metal worker, member of the Makedonija Cultural-Sports-Religious Association in Brussels, president of the Sv. Ilija Church community, former member of the OKM [Macedonian Liberation Committee], the DOOM, and the VMRO-DPMNE, and former chief controller of the VMRO-DPMNE Committee Abroad. His latest political activity is the starting of and membership in the newly-formed party that was formed last year, the Macedonian National Front, whose chairman is Dragan Bogdanovski.

To the Macedonian public, Ljubo Jovanovski is known as one of the main personages in the "Sina Ptica" affair involving the establishment of the so-called Macedonian National Guard (April 1992). Jovanovski previously disagreed with the activities of the committee abroad, asking for the "unification and joint action for the creation of a free and united Macedonia, together with a pro-Bulgarian emigre MPO [Macedonian Political Organization] in the United States and Canada, and the supremacist wing of the VMRO-SMD [VMRO-Union of Macedonian Societies] in Sofia." He subsequently resigned from the VMRO-DPMNE and became member of the new party headed by Dragan Bogdanovski, for which reason he was attacked by the VMRO-DPMNE leadership for "collaborating with the Macedonian police."

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

## Federal

### Sainovic To Attend Libya Revolution Anniversary

*LD3008103694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0919 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Text] Belgrade, 30 Aug (TANJUG)—Nikola Sainovic, deputy prime minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, has left for Libya where, as a special envoy of FRY President Zoran Lilic, he will attend the ceremony marking the 25th anniversary of the great 1 September revolution.

During his stay in Libya Sainovic is expected to have meetings with senior Libyan officials to discuss bilateral relations.

### Ministry on Increase of FYROM Border Incidents

*LD3008163794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1557 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Text] Belgrade, 30 Aug (TANJUG)—"The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs is very concerned about a dangerous escalation of border incidents caused by the bodies of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] on the border with the FRY," a statement forwarded to TANJUG by the ministry's press office says.

The statement reads:

"The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs most vehemently condemns the serious and tragic incidents of 20 and 29 August, in which Yugoslav citizens Nebojsa Martinovic from Pec and Goran Stevanovic from Leskovac lost their lives.

"Around 1930 on 29 August, in the immediate vicinity of the border crossing near Presevo, Yugoslav citizen Goran Stevanovic, who was 250 meters inside FRY territory, was killed by a FYROM border patrol. After the killing, the FYROM patrol crossed into FRY territory and removed Stevanovic's body.

"This is the second tragic incident that has taken place in the past 10 days in which a Yugoslav citizen lost his life. On 20 August, a Macedonian border patrol killed an unarmed civilian, Nebojsa Martinovic, and wounded another person in the border area of Jazince, even though they did not offer any resistance.

"The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs warns that nothing can justify the killings of unarmed civilians, citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by FYROM authorities. At the same time, this represents a dangerous escalation of a mistaken policy and a blow to the efforts being made for the normalization of relations.

"By causing such dangerous border incidents and provocations, the FYROM has been trying to attract international public attention to the imaginary danger coming from the north, to justify the presence of foreign troops on its territory, and to induce the lifting of the arms embargo.

"The FYROM authorities bear full responsibility for the death of two Yugoslav citizens and the wounding of one other.

"Proceeding from its principled position in favor of the normalization of relations with the FYROM and the restoration of severed ties, the FRY rightly expects the FYROM to abandon the policy of provocation, to take the necessary measures for the prevention of border incidents, to secure a situation of normality in the border area, and to punish those responsible for the tragic consequences."

### Kosovo Leaders' Remarks on Dialogue Viewed

*AU3008135894 Belgrade NEDELJNA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 27-28 Aug 94 p 9*

[R. Barjaktarevic report: "The Obligatory Third Party"]

[Text] Pristina—Fehmi Agani, vice chairman of the Democratic League of Kosovo, has had contacts (by telephone) with Geert Ahrens inquiring about the chances for a Serbian-Albanian dialogue and about including Albanian schools in normal operations. Ahrens was told that the Albanians are in favor of dialogue, provided it is in the presence of a third party. After Ahrens' meeting with Belgrade, that is, with Yugoslav statesmen, however, the chances in this respect are "feeble."

Speaking about the matter at a news conference yesterday, Ibrahim Rugova and Geert Ahrens said the following:

"In Belgrade, Geert Ahrens first asked about the position of the Serbs in other republics of the former Yugoslavia. The Kosovo problem was also mentioned, but there is anyway a special group for Kosovo within the Geneva Conference. We shall stay in contact. It is known that for two years we have been talking about all the problems, but without results. We shall see whether the Geneva Conference will function again or some other form of talks will have to be found," Rugova said.

Professor Dr. Fehmi Agani added the following:

"I do not consider the talks about schools to be final, but I do not see any chance of an early dialogue that would promise much, because, being under internal political pressure, the regime in Serbia is not free to decide about the problems of Kosovo and therefore the problem of schools. Secondly, the Albanian schools are still being used to blockade and apply political pressure to Albanians. Third, the Serbian regime in Kosovo would only like to adopt something but not pay Albanian teachers."

In reply to a BORBA question about the chances of opening a "bureau of the Republic of Kosovo" in Belgrade, as he announced last week, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Kosovo Albanians, said the following:

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

"They are chances without a chance. It was with the best of intentions that we have presented our demand to open our bureau in Belgrade, just as we have done in several countries. We think that this is very significant in order to communicate with Serbia. However, I hope that the chance will arise and that a bureau will be opened in Belgrade. That will do nobody any harm."

In reply to the additional question of how he is going to contact the Serbian side, Rugova said the following: "We shall see, we shall seek various channels."

Just as he has done many times before, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova again asked for the international community to place Kosovo under a protectorate.

### Sandzak Muslims Favor 'Indivisible' Bosnia

*AU3008202294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Text] The Coordination Body of the Muslim National Council of Sandzak—which has assumed the powers of Sulejman Ugljanin, president of the Muslim National Council of Sandzak and the Party of Democratic Action in Sandzak, in the absence of President Sulejman Ugljanin—held a regular session in Novi Pazar on Sunday, 28 August.

In addition to prominent party members, representatives of national institutions, and those party officials who have not been arrested, the session was also attended by members of the executive committees of all party branches. The meeting extended support to the Coordination Body for the work that it has done under extraordinary circumstances in the party, and for representing the interests of the Bosniak Muslim people of Sandzak in its contacts with international and other delegations.

It was also stressed that those who do not respect the decisions that had been passed do not have the right to represent the council. The participants in the meeting asked President Sulejman Ugljanin to continue his activities on the peaceful settlement of the Sandzak issue.

The participants in the session stressed that the main objective of the Muslim National Council of Sandzak is a sovereign and indivisible Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that its leadership represent general Bosniak national interests and strive for the realization of a special status for Sandzak. The following requests were also presented:

That the Sandzak issue be urgently included in the talks at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia;

That the crisis in the former Yugoslavia be solved globally, and not partially;

That the memorandum on establishing a special status for Sandzak be a starting point in the settlement of the issues of Sandzak and the status of Bosniak Muslims in Sandzak;

That Sulejman Ugljanin be taken off the wanted list and that he be allowed to return;

That a CSCE mission be allowed to continue in Sandzak;

That military-police terror stop in Sandzak;

That rigged police trials stop;

That UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] be sent to Sandzak to prevent conflicts.

The meeting also issued a message that attempts to impose a new Fikret Abdic in Sandzak will not succeed.

## Serbia

### Milosevic Accepting Foreign Observers on Border

*LD3108105294 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 31 Aug 94*

[Text] In his recent talks with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic accepted the deployment of 400 international observers along the Serbian-Bosnia-Herzegovinan border, says a report carried by the TELEGRAF newspaper of Belgrade today.

The condition is that the observers should be from Russia, Greece, and other friendly countries; they should perform their duties in plain clothes and be accompanied by the Serbian police. TELEGRAF also carries details of Kozyrev's promises to Milosevic: Once the foreign observers have been deployed, Serbia will be allowed to open Belgrade's Surcin Airport. The airport will be used for three international flights daily: Belgrade-Moscow by the Russian Aeroflot airline, Belgrade-Zurich by Swissair, and one other international route.

The second promise by the Russian minister refers to participation in international competitions by sportsmen from Serbia and Montenegro. Milosevic allegedly demanded the lifting of the scientific and cultural blockade, free transportation of goods from neighboring countries and Greece, free transportation by freight vessels, the importation of heating oil for schools and hospitals, and permission for JAT [Yugoslav Airlines] to resume its international routes.

TELEGRAF, which is quoting reliable sources, says that an agreement has been reached.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

## SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735,or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.